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Introduction 
 
 
 Historical fiction is a popular form of literary entertainment in the United States. 
Novels with historical themes like World War II, the Civil War, life in the Victorian age, 
and the Cold War appear regularly in bookstores and often have large readerships.
1
 
Unfortunately, many of these “historical” fictions are created without careful research, 
leaving the audience unsure of what events in the novel are historically accurate versus 
those that are seated in the author’s imagination. Some authors also incorporate popular 
historical misconceptions in their work, which serves only to further myths about and 
romanticize the past.   
 Historical fiction thus is a genre that needs to be handled with care. If a novel is 
not well-researched and puts forth only the author’s preconceptions about the past, 
readers are left ill-informed about historical events and, more importantly, what history 
is. This situation contributes to the ongoing inability of American adults to answer simple 
questions about history correctly and also makes readers less likely to think critically 
about past events. A recent study by historians Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen 
revealed that Americans ranked the trustworthiness of nonfiction history books only 6.4 
out of a possible 10, with 10 being the most trustworthy.
2
 It is vital that historians writing 
fiction keep Rosenzweig and Thelen’s findings in mind when reaching out to audiences 
beyond the academy, and strive to increase the trustworthiness of their publications if 
they wish to use historical fiction as a teaching tool. 
                                                 
1 The Historical Novel Society, accessible online at www.historicalnovelsociety.org, attempts to 
review every work of historical fiction published in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia each year. On average, the Society reviews more then 800 works annually, providing insight into 
the popularity of historical fiction. Similarly, simply browsing the bestseller lists in the New York Times 
and Publishers Weekly reveals numerous novels with historical themes. 
2 Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The Presence of the Past: Popular Uses of History in 
American Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 234-235. 
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 One segment of historical fiction that leads the way in terms of historical accuracy 
and trustworthiness among readers is historical romance. Janice Radway, in Reading the 
Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature, notes that female readers of 
historical romance novels say such books “teach them about faraway places and times 
and instruct them in the customs of other cultures.”
3
 Many authors of historical romance 
novels go to great lengths to research the era in which their tales of passion and love are 
set, and do so with the knowledge that their readers often pass the historical information 
they learn in the romance novel to friends and family members.
4
 An editor at Dell 
Publishing maintained an extensive research library on the English Regency in order to 
fact-check manuscripts in one particular romance series, revealing her understanding that 
“instruction is one of the principal functions books can perform for their readers.”
5
  
 Rosenzweig and Thelen also provide insight into how the academy defines history 
and how the American public defines it. The distance between the two is a space that 
historical fiction may be able to help bridge. For academic historians, the focus on the 
past tends to be towards large narratives that act as frameworks for their particular areas 
of study. For example, Rosenzweig, as a historian, expected to hear stories from survey 
respondents about “how the defeat of the South in the Civil War…shaped their 
identities…about how grandparents encountered ‘No Irish Need Apply’ signs…but these 
stories weren’t there. Neither were narratives of American national progress—the landing 
of the Pilgrims, the signing of the Constitution….”
6
 Instead, they discovered that 
Americans are acquainted with the past through their own families, their stories, their 
                                                 
3 Janice Radway, Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 107. 
4 Ibid., 107, 111-112.  
5 Ibid., 109. 
6 Rosenzweig and Thelen, Presence of the Past, 9. 
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ancestors’ experiences. If a historian wants to reach a public audience through fiction, she 
must keep this in mind and write in such a way that a reader be able to identify with the 
story and characters, rather than create a set of circumstances so abstract as to make it 
feel like a textbook.  
            Fortunately, there are ways for authors of historical fiction to avoid the pitfalls of 
historical generalization and misinformation. This consists mainly of conducting 
responsible, scholarly historical research into the topic presented in the novel. 
Investigating primary documents and sources, interviewing individuals who witnessed 
historical events or participated in them, becoming familiar with the secondary literature 
of a topic, and acquainting oneself with the real characters and settings of a past event are 
all crucial ways of making a work of historical fiction something far more valuable than 
just a novel. With the proper research, a historical novel can become a teaching tool that 
reaches more audiences than scholarly history texts and that is also, to a majority of 
people, more enjoyable to read. 
 Inclusion of either endnotes or footnotes within a historical novel also gives such 
a work a scholarly grounding that is often absent from historical fiction. By providing a 
reader with sources to turn to for further information and to document the work’s 
accuracy, an author demonstrates that she has conducted her own research and is able to 
verify certain historical events. Similarly, using a note system allows an author to clarify 
when she is taking liberties with past events. Whether this consists of using an 
amalgamation of individuals from the past to create a fictional character or describing a 
certain setting with some exaggeration, the author can explain briefly in an endnote that 
which is not historically accurate versus that which is. 
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 Including primary documents within the novel itself is another way of ensuring 
that readers are educated and entertained. Non-scholars are generally unfamiliar with 
historical documents, what they look like, how much or how little information they hold, 
their need for interpretation, and how powerful they can be to view for oneself. Seeing a 
memo signed by Franklin Roosevelt firsthand can be far more effective and exciting than 
making up quotation from him during a fictionalized dialog in a novel. Displaying and 
editing select documents is a potent way of both allowing the reader to become more 
intimate with the past as well as learning about history. 
 For the average writer, this emphasis on historical accuracy and responsibility 
might be overwhelming. However, to a historian venturing into the world of historical 
fiction, there can be no other way. A historian has been trained in all the necessary 
methods of research and notation, and it is her responsibility to write historical fiction as 
carefully and thoroughly as though she was creating an article for a historical journal. Yet 
there are two differences that the historian must take into account when writing historical 
fiction. The first is that historical fiction is generally designed to tell a story, not to argue 
the importance of that story explicitly. While the author does imply the significance of 
the events being addressed, most works of fiction do not ask the questions that historical 
monographs begin with. This can be difficult concept to grasp for the academic historian 
who wishes to write historical fiction. One must decide before beginning the writing 
process how to incorporate the significance of the history being explained into the 
narrative. Potential ways of doing this include having the characters ask the questions that 
the historian normally would begin with, writing a brief foreword or appendix clarifying 
the historical significance of the topic, including reference notes, working it into the 
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characters’ dialog, or writing the historical portions as a flashback, which enables the 
author to include commentary on what happened in the past and its impact on later times. 
The other thing that is different is her audience. No longer can she rely on jargon 
that only her scholarly peers can understand. Instead, she must focus on presenting her 
research in an entertaining and educating way to individuals who wish to spend their free 
time reading about the past, with a twist of fiction thrown in. It is the task of the historian, 
then, to revamp the genre of historical fiction, to make this written history more 
accessible to a wide readership and more valuable to professionally trained scholars. 
There are also similarities between history and fiction that can make combining 
the two easier. As all historians should recognize, one can never know all of the exact 
facts and details about the past. The nature of history simply does not allow for such 
knowledge, and as a result history can never be complete, nor can it be entirely accurate. 
There exists in all historical studies the need for some conjecture, some guesswork, and 
some filling-in of gaps within the story. In its simplest form, these parts of historical 
scholarship are fiction. They may be based on surrounding facts and educated inferences, 
but they remain creations of the historian. Simon Schama took this concept to the 
extreme in Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations), writing two historical events 
from the points of view of various participants, some real and some invented by Schama, 
in each event. The first deals with the British conquest at the Battle of Quebec led by 
General James Wolfe, and its far-reaching impact, not only on those who participated in 
it, but those who painted it and wrote about it.
7
 The second episode in the book deals with 
the murder of a prominent Bostonian and traces the investigation, trial, and conviction of 
                                                 
7 Simon Schama, Dead Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1991), 327. 
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the murderer, told through trial transcripts, letters, journals, and, most importantly, 
Schama’s own imagining of the events.
8
   
This methodology allows Schama to illuminate more fully the historical events he 
is investigating and also gives him license to fill in the gaps that he encounters in his 
historical research. The end result is a powerful combination of history and fiction that 
remains at once educational and accessible to a non-scholarly audience. His endnotes 
clarify what is based on fact and what he has invented, and also directs readers to the 
sources that he used. Overall, Schama harmoniously marries fiction and history. 
This is not to imply that methods like those used in Dead Certainties are accepted 
by all academic historians. Cushing Strout explains some of the complexities between 
history and fiction, and the dangers of closely combining the two, namely reducing 
historiography to “arbitrary aesthetic and political preferences.” Yet he also reminds the 
reader that realism in fiction can enlarge historical understanding.
9
 This ongoing debate 
amongst historians and literary scholars underlines both how carefully historical fiction 
must be handled and also how valuable it is. 
 I believe that historical fiction, as a genre, can find a place within historical 
scholarship when done responsibly. The realm of public history perhaps is the best place 
to associate historical fiction within the world of historical scholarship. Public history 
aims to teach history to adults and children outside of traditional classroom settings. 
Keeping in mind that not everyone learns best from lectures or textbooks, teachers of 
                                                 
8 Schama, 331. 
9 Cushing Strout, “Border Crossings: History, Fiction, and Dead Certainties,” History and Theory 
Vol. 31, No. 2, May 1992, 153-162. I also suggest works by Carlo Ginzburg, Natalie Zemon Davis, Hayden 
White, Roland Barthes, and Lionel Grossman to gain a fuller understanding of the debate between 
academics on the role of fiction in history and vice versa. 
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history are burdened with finding new ways to teach the past. For adults and children 
alike, this can be accomplished by contextualizing factual, researched history within the 
wider framework of a fictional story. While the characters or events in historical fiction 
may be invented, or based on a conglomeration of real historical characters or events, the 
possibility exists to use such elements within the story to teach facts about the past. Using 
the tools I have mentioned above—endnotes, primary documents, historiographies—
historical fiction becomes a means of both improving the educational resources available 
outside of the history classroom and garnering more support for public history within the 
field of historical scholarship.    
 With the above opinion in mind, I set out to begin my public history Master’s 
thesis. My aim was to conduct the research necessary to write a responsible historical 
novel about the Office of Strategic Services’ (OSS) infiltration of Nazi Germany.  
The first chapter of this thesis provides the background of the Labor Branch and the OSS 
as a whole. From the OSS’s inception in 1942 through its postwar transformation into the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), I cover the evolution of the foreign intelligence 
community in the United States. This includes sections on the politics within the OSS, the 
reasons the Labor Branch has not been a focal point of OSS research, and quirks about 
the Labor Branch that make it stand out from the rest of the OSS. The Labor Branch’s 
specific role in the infiltration of Germany is also discussed in chapter one.  
 Chapter two is an extension of the materials presented in the first chapter. It 
focuses on a section of the Labor Branch called Bach Section. This section was devoted 
to making the infiltration of Germany possible by creating cover stories, forging 
documents, and preparing agents to go to Germany in the midst of Nazism and be able to 
  8 
survive, gather intelligence, and create resistance networks. The bravery, intelligence, 
and will of the Bach Section are clear in this chapter, and the reader will recognize that, 
without the Labor Branch and their colleagues at the Bach Section, no one, be they with 
the OSS or British intelligence, would have had much success in infiltrating Germany 
during World War II. 
 My third chapter is a bit more complicated than the first two. In it, I discuss the 
nuances of writing historical fiction responsibly and as a viable means of public history. 
As guidance, I undertake a discussion of the OSS in published works of fiction. I give an 
overview of the way different novelists handle the bureaucracy, agents, accomplishments, 
and failures of the OSS, revealing what I feel each does effectively and poorly. While 
discussing each of the potential strengths and pitfalls of historical fiction, especially as 
seen in the OSS novels, I then provide real examples of how historical fiction might work 
with a case study involving the OSS Labor Branch. One particular OSS mission, known 
as the Hammer Mission, serves as my example. I detail different parts of the mission, the 
men who participated, their training, and the mission itself and discuss how to use these 
details within a novel.  
 Before I begin, however, I feel it is important to include in this introduction a 
brief historiography of the OSS in order to enable the reader to better understand this 
paper’s contribution to that historiography, a topic which will be covered in the 
conclusion. 
When OSS monographs were first published, they suffered greatly from the lack 
of available primary sources. For thirty years after the deconstruction of the OSS in 1945, 
historians and other researchers had to rely solely on oral history, personal memory, and a 
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few minor, non-contextualized documents indirectly relating to the OSS that had been 
released or recovered over the years. Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden’s Sub Rosa: The 
O.S.S. and American Espionage, released in 1946, was the first attempt at a history of the 
OSS. Unfortunately, it has no bibliography or notes.
10
 An examination of the notes and 
bibliography in R. Harris Smith’s OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central 
Intelligence Agency (1972) reveals his reliance on memoirs, personal correspondence 
with former OSS staff, and some secondary literature.
11
 He simply could not go to an 
archive and find original primary source material because it had not been made available.  
Fortunately, in 1976, the first major OSS report was released by the government. 
War Report of the OSS, prepared by the U. S. War Department, was originally written in 
1947, but for thirty years it was deemed too sensitive to release to the public due to the 
in-depth discussion it provides about the hierarchy and structure of the OSS.
12
 A second 
volume of the War Report, entitled The Overseas Targets, was also published in 1976 
and provides a breakdown of missions and actions undertaken in each theater of the 
war.
13
 Together, the two volumes of the report provide insight into the nature of the OSS 
and the operations it conducted. The release of these two top-secret reports was the first 
time any OSS document of major significance was made available to scholars, and was 
followed by the release of many other documents, memos, and reports. This slow release 
of documents impacted scholars’ understanding of the OSS’ many facets and 
fundamentally changed the historiography of the OSS. 
                                                 
10 Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa: The O.S.S. and American Espionage (New York: 
Reynal and Hitchcock, 1946).  
11 R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 387-435. 
12 United States War Department, War Report of the OSS (New York: Walker and Company, 
1976). 
13 United States War Department, The Overseas Target: War Report of the OSS: Volume 2 (New 
York: Walker and Company, 1976). 
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However, the most fascinating case in the progression of the OSS historiography 
involves the infiltration of Germany in 1944 and 1945, arguably the agency’s single 
greatest achievement and the focus of my thesis research. The OSS sent over 200 men 
and women successfully into Germany proper, where they gathered intelligence about 
military strength and movement, reported on the status of infrastructure and industrial 
production, circulated both overt and covert propaganda, established and improved 
resistance groups, and even infiltrated the ranks of the Gestapo. Interestingly, the early 
histories of the OSS do little justice and pay little heed to the events that took place 
within Germany. Once more, the availability of information about OSS actions changed 
that situation dramatically and, after 1978, a slew of books dealing with different aspects 
of the infiltration of Germany appeared. 
Before examining two of those books, Sub Rosa and OSS must first be analyzed 
for their handling of the infiltration of Germany. This will establish a means for 
comparison with works that followed the opening of the OSS documents. Amazingly, of 
the seven specific cases that Alsop and Braden emphasize in Sub Rosa, not a single one 
deals with the infiltration of the German state, although their two major cohesive themes 
in the book are intelligence and resistance. These two organizing themes fit perfectly with 
what the OSS accomplished in Germany, and the absence of any discussion about the 
infiltration is striking. This absence implies that the authors either did not know about the 
penetration of Germany or had a different understanding of its success and significance. 
Interestingly, Smith’s OSS has a chapter supposedly devoted to discussing the 
infiltration, but a simple reading of the chapter reveals Smith’s consistent inability to 
actually tell what happened. He says, “…OSS infiltration of Germany became of supreme 
  11 
importance in the fall of that year [1944]…,” implying the start of a discussion about that 
very topic.
14
 However, the following paragraphs have nothing to do with the importance 
of infiltration or even if there was any infiltration! The rest of the chapter continues to 
dance around the issue. He identifies who he says would have been involved in 
arrangements to infiltrate Germany, says that these people wanted to do so, even 
mentions the names of some infiltration missions, but never addresses the issue of how 
they did it. When he does lead the reader into thinking he will be discussing infiltration 
by mentioning dealings the OSS had with German groups and officials, he then 
undermines himself because these dealings had little aspects of infiltration—they were 
usually just negotiations.
15
 Despite Smith’s best efforts, with the sources he had available 
he was clearly unable to do justice to the level of significance of the infiltration of 
Germany. He obviously did recognize that it was important—he could not, however, tell 
how it was done. 
Concerning the issue of infiltrating Germany, the sudden availability of OSS 
documents after 1976 turned the historiography of the OSS upside down, and two books 
in particular are indicative of the changes and advancements that have been made. The 
first, Joseph Persico’s Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American 
Secret Agents during World War II, was published in 1979 and begins with the line, 
“This story could not be told for thirty years.” The story revealed is so richly nuanced and 
detailed, especially when compared with Smith’s book from just seven years before, that 
the value of OSS historiography grew exponentially with the utilization of the resources 
that Persico includes. Told in a chronological narrative, this book traces a multitude of 
                                                 
14 Smith, OSS, 227. 
15 Ibid., 212-213. 
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individual missions, how they were planned, who was involved, and how they were 
executed. They range from the so-called tourist missions where OSS agents would walk 
or drive across the front lines into Germany, gather general intelligence for a few days, 
then return to their handlers on the Allied side of the line, to the so-called HAMMER 
mission, whereby two former residents of Berlin who had been recruited and trained by 
the OSS would parachute back into Germany, make their way to the capital, establish 
contact with a known resistance group, transmit intelligence via radio, and prepare for the 
reception of more agents.
16
 In recounting this and many other missions, Persico reveals 
the agents’ names, cover stories, personal experiences and biographies, and adventures 
within the OSS. He supports all of this with primary source material, and the result is a 
book so highly detailed that some of the significance of what these missions involved is 
lost or overemphasized. 
Indeed, the greatest criticism of Persico’s work is that he becomes so involved in 
telling the stories of the OSS infiltration of Germany for the very first time that he cannot 
objectively explain what it all meant. Other books published immediately after the 
opening of the OSS archives have the same problem. Time needed to pass before scholars 
became less concerned with relaying the stories and more interested in examining how 
such missions relating to the penetration of Germany fit in the larger realm of the OSS, 
intelligence history, and World War II. This was best accomplished in 1999 by a German 
historian, Christof Mauch, in The Shadow War Against Hitler: The Covert Operations of 
America’s Wartime Secret Intelligence Service.   
                                                 
16 Joseph Persico, Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret 
Agents during World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1979), 114-115, 177. 
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Unlike Persico, who jumps straight into the details of the infiltration, Mauch 
establishes “The Place of the OSS in American History” and the “Anatomy of the OSS,” 
according to two of his chapter sub-headings. Doing so provides the reader with some 
perspective on what he will encounter in terms of the infiltration and, essentially, gives 
context to all the missions he discusses. While Mauch delves briefly into exciting stories 
of espionage, parachuting, and sabotage, they are tempered by his discussions of what 
these missions accomplished. He claims “The significance of individual OSS projects 
was minor and…had hardly any impact on the outcome of the Second World War. The 
sum total of all the single operations did amount to something weightier. If [the OSS] had 
not existed, the end of the war would have been drawn out for at least several weeks.”
17
  
Because of this argument, Mauch’s book does not lapse into simple retellings of missions 
and operations as do so many books about the OSS. His work, very heavily based in 
primary source research, instead finds a healthy balance between what the OSS did and 
the impact that those actions had.  
This is a clear change from the other works examined in this brief historiography. 
The progression of the analysis of the OSS’ actions is perhaps natural, going first from a 
simple retelling of oral and popular stories, to a historical review by R. Harris Smith, to 
Perisco’s natural fascination with the new possibility to accurately tell stories of 
espionage and intrigue. It is only fitting that one of the most recent books on the OSS, in 
The Shadow War Against Hitler, builds upon all of these traditions and takes the best 
parts from each. Mauch recognizes that the stories of individual agents, male and female, 
                                                 
17 Christof Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America’s Wartime 
Secret Intelligence Service, trans. Jeremiah M. Riemer (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 219. 
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deserve to be told, but at the same time analyzed in such a way that they are not left to 
stand on their own.  
Most importantly, the growth in the level of scholarship on the OSS could not 
have been seen had the primary sources not become available in the mid-1970s. It is safe 
to say that, by the time the War Reports and a multitude of other documents were 
released, the historiography and study of the OSS had become stagnant through thirty 
years of withheld information. The combination of new sources and old traditions in the 
OSS historiography has raised the quality of OSS scholarship at present to its most 
advanced.  
I believe that the information that follows will continue to build upon this OSS 
historiography and introduce new information and sources. My focus on the Labor 
Branch of the OSS is one of the most in-depth ventures into this particular subsection of 
OSS history. Thus I set out from here to lead you into a world of spies, intrigue, cover 
stories, and to be fair, bureaucracy. The OSS was a government agency, after all. But 
even bureaucracy can be interesting—I hope I have made it so.  
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Chapter One 
 
   
The OSS Labor Branch and the Infiltration of Nazi Germany 
 
 
The agents went into Germany with radios in their packs and cover stories 
committed to memory. They arrived on foot, pedaled into enemy territory on bicycles, 
and parachuted from planes on moonless nights. Once inside the German heartland, they 
sabotaged factories and machines, recruited laborers to their underground cause, and 
infiltrated the Reich’s postal service with propaganda. Such agents had one thing in 
common—their infiltration was planned, prepared, and executed by the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS). This agency, though only in existence from June 1942 through 
September 1945, became the United States’ main intelligence organization during World 
War II.
18
 With its vast conglomeration of desks, branches, and divisions, the OSS was 
involved in a wide range of activities, from propaganda and infiltration to the creation of 
specialized weapons and disguises. Yet some branches were more active and important 
than others. The Labor Branch, for example, facilitated the penetration of Germany and 
caused an entire division of the OSS to be rearranged using it as a model. The Labor 
Branch’s willingness to collaborate with other intelligence branches and agencies, its 
early planning for infiltration missions, and its insistence that Germany could be 
infiltrated enabled the successful penetration of Nazi Germany in 1944 and 1945 by 
nearly 200 agents.
19
 
                                                 
18 The OSS was dismantled in late 1945 and reorganized in 1947 by Harry Truman into the 
Central Intelligence Agency. For information on this topic, see Thomas Troy’s Donovan and the CIA: A 
History of the Establishment of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America, 1981). 
19 Walter Lord, Report, Penetration Projects, June 4, 1945, Folder 59, Box 14, Entry 99, Record 
Group (RG) 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, 1919-1949, National Archives, College Park, 
Maryland (NA). Also, in the interest of clarity, in this paper the penetration of Germany refers to the 
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Before the Labor Branch can be examined, the development of the OSS must first 
be analyzed. The Office of Strategic Services was organized in 1942 to replace, 
consolidate, and clarify the intelligence responsibilities of its predecessor, the Office of 
the Coordinator of Information (COI). Operational since June of 1941, the COI found 
itself quickly embroiled in turf battles with the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Army’s intelligence branch, G-2, arguing over who 
could conduct cryptanalysis, covert operations, propaganda, and special operations.
20
 The 
crisis inherent in this bickering became apparent in December 1941. Although the COI 
had come into existence six months before the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, army and 
naval intelligence had never allowed the COI to examine the intercepted Japanese radio 
traffic that hinted an attack was imminent.
21
 The attack by the Japanese demonstrated the 
critical need for a centralized foreign intelligence agency.  
In an effort to coordinate the gathering and examination of intelligence and to 
resolve the squabbling between the plethora of American intelligence bodies, Presidet 
Franklin Roosevelt created the Office of War Information (OWI) and the OSS in 1942. 
OWI was to handle matters of propaganda. The OSS, meanwhile, began planning and 
operating “such special services as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.”
22
 While this directive was vague, it allowed the OSS to set up its new staff in a 
centralized plan that American intelligence had never had before. The army and navy 
would maintain their individual intelligence branches, but the OSS was clearly to be the 
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dominant agency in foreign intelligence-gathering and analysis. By putting the OSS 
under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Roosevelt also ensured that the 
military would have a direct relationship with the OSS, that military leaders would be 
fully advised of OSS achievements and discoveries, and thus be able to use any 
intelligence the OSS gathered in military actions.
23
  
Despite Roosevelt’s intentions to clear up competition between agencies, when 
the COI was reconfigured into the OSS there initially was misunderstanding and 
disagreement between OSS staff and the JCS over budget issues, responsibilities of the 
OSS, and acceptable psychological warfare operations by the OSS. A forceful 
memorandum from OSS Director William Donovan to a JCS committee finally resolved 
this quarrel. By December, the OSS staff had some clear direction on their duties: “the 
planning, development, coordination and execution of the military program for 
psychological warfare” and the “compilation of such political, psychological, 
sociological and economic information as may be required by military operations.”
24
 In 
1943, the JCS gave the OSS an even more explicit directive. It would now  
maintain liaison officers with Allied intelligence services, get information 
from and give support to underground groups, conduct propaganda, and 
accumulate and analyze economic, political and military information that 
would be used to prepare studies on how to “enforce our will upon the 
enemy by means other than military action.”
25
  
 
With this directive, the OSS gained permission to become a true intelligence agency 
capable of spying, infiltrating enemy nations, and conducting sabotage and covert special 
operations. It would prove to be surprisingly capable in each of these tasks. 
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When Roosevelt formed the OSS, he appointed William “Wild Bill” Donovan 
director. Previously, Donovan had been the driving force behind the creation of COI. He 
traveled to Britain in 1940 on the orders of President Roosevelt and saw first-hand that 
country’s advanced network of espionage and intelligence groups. The British were 
happy to see Donovan, for they hoped to show the Americans the advantages of having a 
coordinated secret intelligence service. After all, the British recognized the United States 
as their best potential ally in the war against Germany. Helping the Americans understand 
the utility of secret intelligence and preparing them to organize their own American 
agency could only be of benefit to Britain in the future.
26
 Donovan thus became the first 
link between U. S. and British intelligence agencies. 
Donovan, born in New York in 1883, had fought bravely in the First World War, 
earning the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Medal 
of Honor as a colonel. After the war, he campaigned unsuccessfully for both lieutenant 
governor and governor of New York. He was, however, appointed a U. S. assistant 
attorney general in 1924 and through this position gained more contacts and influence in 
the federal government. He traveled often, keeping himself apprised of the military and 
political changes in Europe and in Germany in particular. He even had the opportunity in 
1937 to attend maneuvers of the German reserves, observe their training, and inspect new 
German tanks. He included his observations in a report to the U. S. government that the 
War Department commended as “valuable and pertinent.” By 1940, the United States was 
on a path towards involvement in the war in Europe. Roosevelt called on Donovan to 
begin investigating the creation of a secret intelligence group. While Donovan initially 
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had hoped Roosevelt would call on him to become Secretary of State, he took his new 
appointment as an emissary to Britain in stride. This position would eventually lead to 
Donovan’s selection as director of the COI and OSS.
27
 
Understanding Donovan’s background is vital to understanding the OSS, as he 
had very direct influence on its day-to-day operation and organization. His outgoing 
personality led to a tendency to hire others who were audacious and extroverted, 
contributing to the long-running joke that OSS actually stood for “Oh, so social!” He 
traveled widely through the war zones, sent and received countless memos and reports, 
and oversaw the entire agency. This included organizing the OSS into a system of 
branches and offices that can be generalized as follows: at the top of the hierarchy was 
the Director (Donovan), aided by a Planning Group and Planning Staff. Beneath the 
Director were two Assistant Directors, who then oversaw the various upper-level 
managerial departments. Beneath these groups were the heart and soul of OSS, the 
Strategic Services Operation and Intelligence, which each contained a number of more 
specialized divisions overseen by a deputy director. Other logistical branches appeared 
further down the flow chart.
28
 One must be aware, however, that this hierarchy was not 
static. Branches came under new leadership, new branches were formed and others were 
disbanded over the years, and some branches even took over others, making this a 
simplified representation of how the OSS was arranged (see Appendix, Fig. 1).   
The most interesting work done by the OSS fell to the groups under the headings 
Strategic Services Operation and Intelligence. Strategic Services branches were supposed 
to “effect physical subversion of the enemy.” Functions included sabotage and support 
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and supply of resistance groups. Morale Operations specialized in so-called “black” 
propaganda, which is “subversive by every device, disguises its source, and is disowned 
by the government using it.”
29
 Maritime Unit, as the name suggests, undertook Special 
Operations (SO) missions by sea: infiltrating agents, supplying resistance groups, 
executing maritime sabotage, and developing effective equipment to make such tasks 
possible and more successful. Other branches of Strategic Services Operation had similar 
goals, and the division can be summarized as the one responsible for physical action by 
the OSS.
30
 
The Intelligence group members were more subtle in their methods. Research and 
Analysis staff, for example, were a large group of talented historians, economists, 
psychologists, and other academics whose purpose was to understand the enemy and to 
analyze all intelligence gathered by the OSS. Secret Intelligence’s (SI) objective was to 
“obtain by secret means information which cannot otherwise be secured and which is not 
elsewhere available….An effective secret intelligence organization is one which not only 
can obtain such information at random but can secure it when needed.”
31
 This 
necessitated organizing Geographic Desks around the world to gather specific 
intelligence from specific places, thereby adding another layer to the OSS hierarchy. 
Finally, X-2, or Counterespionage, “embraces not only the protection of the intelligence 
interests of the government it serves, but, by control and manipulation of the intelligence 
operations of other nations, it performs a dynamic function in discerning their plans and 
intentions, as well as in deceiving them.”
32
 Thus, X-2 was OSS’ means to monitor enemy 
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intelligence services and protect America’s intelligence as well. Overall, Intelligence was 
responsible for both the gathering and analysis of intelligence information. 
Within this web of groups, branches, and divisions lay a number of smaller 
groups. One such branch was the Labor Branch, which initially fell under the direction of 
Secret Intelligence but eventually incorporated elements of Special Operations as well.  
The Labor Branch was established early in the history of the OSS, in July of 1942, and its 
original goal was to gather intelligence by working with established and underground 
labor organizations in the hopes of learning about enemy industrial and production 
capabilities.
33
 It was made up of individuals who  
knew labor problems, and who understood and respected the points of 
view of labor and its leaders—who had or could inspire their 
confidence…. At the same time, rivalries among various factions in the 
field of trade unionism made it impractical to staff the Section with men 
from the unions themselves….[they] sought to recruit…men who were 
thoroughly familiar with labor questions but who were not identified with 
any particular labor element or point of view.
34
 
 
As a result, a number of labor attorneys and scholarly experts found themselves on the 
OSS payroll. Absent from OSS, however, was anyone associated with any U. S. labor 
faction. This was not due to a lack of intelligence or ability among union leaders, but to 
avoid bringing the harsh rivalries between leaders of the U. S. labor movement into the 
OSS.
35
 The Branch stationed their labor experts across Europe and North Africa, focusing 
on labor issues in both enemy and neutral European territories. These former attorneys, 
scholars, and union sympathizers would establish the Labor Branch’s most significant 
efforts in Germany.  
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The OSS did not initially comprehend the value of labor groups in intelligence 
work. Before the creation of the OSS and its Labor Branch, an Austrian émigré and 
former Communist named Paul Hagen approached the COI office in New York. Hagen 
had already distinguished himself in the United States by publishing Will Germany 
Crack?, a 1942 book that pointed out Germany’s military and home front weaknesses at a 
time when the German army was rolling across Europe. This work impressed a number 
of people both in the U. S. military and government, though some were suspicious of 
Hagen’s motives in writing it. Regardless, in April 1942 he approached the COI’s chief in 
New York, Allen Dulles. Dulles was receptive to Hagen, as Hagen was respected for his 
research on affairs regarding Germany and had proven to be anti-Nazi and anti-fascist. In 
a memo to Dulles, Hagen pointed out the utility of American cooperation with German 
underground movements. He outlined ways the U. S. could contact these groups, 
primarily via a specialized agency designed to build up contacts with underground groups 
and keep careful records about organized unrest in Germany.
 36
 In a later memo, Hagen 
pointed out that there were more than six million foreign and conscripted workers in 
Germany, a potential army of underground anti-Nazi soldiers.
 
He also stressed the 
number of German labor émigrés in the United States, Britain, and neutral Europe who 
could become part of the effort to create ties with the German underground labor 
groups.
37
 Dulles and his co-workers took Hagen seriously and began to build off of his 
ideas, and by the time the OSS was formed, an organized Labor Branch was on its feet. 
Hagen had clearly laid the groundwork for the creation of the Labor Branch. 
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Arthur Goldberg, chief counsel to the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
staffer with the COI, and future Supreme Court justice, had also had contact with Hagen 
in New York and was influential in getting the Labor Branch established. After a few 
meetings with Hagen, Goldberg recognized the untapped potential of labor intelligence 
and in a memo to Donovan wrote: 
the working people of Europe have unparalleled access to strategic 
information. We must remember that they man the ships and the trains 
which transport the men and materiel of war. They pour the steel, dig the 
coal, process the food and make the munitions which are the sinews of 
war….We can take advantage of the hatred of Hitler by members of the 
European labor movement. They fought the rise of fascism from its 
inception. They are its implacable enemy.
38
 
 
This quotation summarizes the inherent value of labor movements within Europe, and 
especially Germany, to the OSS. If the OSS could tap into the underground labor 
movements, they suspected they would find a greater wealth of information than could be 
gathered from any other single source. Donovan bought the argument, and the Labor 
Branch began its work. 
 In late August 1942, Donovan sent Goldberg to London to establish a division of 
the Labor Branch there. The proximity to continental Europe, German labor refugees, 
exiles, émigrés, and the intelligence operations of the British all influenced the decision 
to make London a major center of Labor Branch operations. By November, another 
former labor attorney, George Pratt, took over Labor Branch operations in London, 
allowing Goldberg to return to the United States. From here he continued to direct the 
branch’s day-to-day operations and work out logistical matters like approving the budget 
and reviewing mission ideas and plans.
39
 Pratt, meanwhile, became the lead man on 
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Labor Branch operations in Britain, contacting German labor leaders living in London 
and setting up the future headquarters for the teams that would penetrate Nazi Germany.  
  The Labor Branch’s first focus was simply gathering information in the United 
Kingdom and neutral European countries about the labor situation in Germany, and 
through that information, any other intelligence that could be gleaned about the military, 
political, and economic situation. Throughout 1942 and 1943, the Labor Branch was able 
to discern the location of important factories that had previously been unknown to the 
Allies, troop movements, the locations of ammunition stores, and strategic bombing 
information. All of this intelligence was gleaned from newspapers smuggled out of 
Germany to the OSS’ friends in labor circles in Britain, the U. S., and North Africa. Their 
labor friends, especially those who had recently fled the Reich, told the Labor Branch 
about German methods of serializing manufactured goods, so that when guns, tanks, and 
vehicles were captured, the Allies could estimate production figures. German laborers 
abroad also gave detailed information about German uniforms, morale, and 
infrastructure.
40
 Indeed, the information that the Labor Branch accessed was some of the 
most useful intelligence gathered during the war, as it allowed the Allies to plan and 
execute military missions and bombing sorties that otherwise would not have been 
conducted. While this is often overlooked, the fact remains that the Labor Branch, while 
small, made contributions throughout the war, and not just regarding the penetration of 
Germany.  
While the Labor Branch originally served as a listening post for incoming 
intelligence about labor and other elements in and around Germany, by August 1943 it 
was actively discussing tactics for infiltrating OSS agents into Germany. This change in 
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focus was a key to the Labor Branch’s success and forced the branch to become more 
flexible and interactive with the OSS as a whole, for the penetration of Nazi Germany 
would necessitate a high level of cooperation between itself and other groups within OSS. 
However, there were a number of tasks that needed to be accomplished before the 
penetration of Germany could be realistically considered. First, the extent of underground 
labor movements inside Germany needed to be determined. The Labor Branch also 
needed to figure out exactly who was involved in labor resistance, where they were 
located, how they could be contacted, and if they could be trusted. Finally, the OSS 
needed to work out how they would infiltrate agents into Germany and what they would 
do once there. Each of these processes must be discussed if the success of the Labor 
Branch in penetrating Germany is to be understood.  
Donovan, Pratt, Goldberg and others recognized that they needed to learn how to 
obtain information from outside Germany’s borders before they had any chance of going 
into Germany itself. Thus, the first step that the Labor Branch took in becoming more 
flexible in its means of intelligence gathering was to discern how active the labor 
resistance in Germany was. In order to do so, the Labor Branch in London began to 
establish ties with German labor members there. There was a vast and confusing 
collection of German labor groups in London; some were communist, some were 
socialist, some had no particular political affiliation, and others had members of mixed 
political interests. One such group, the Trade Union Center for German Workers in Great 
Britain, was the largest organized German labor group in Britain and maintained good 
connections with the International Federation of Trade Unions. This gave the OSS direct 
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access to the group through international labor channels.
41
 Other important groups that 
the OSS established contact with included the National Group of German Trade 
Unionists in Great Britain, the International Transport Workers Federation, and the 
International Socialist Militant League (ISK).
42
 
Members of the OSS’ Labor Branch approached these unions in hopes of 
establishing relationships with individuals who had comprehensive knowledge about the 
underground in Europe and especially Germany. Eventually, these groups would also be 
mined for volunteers to return to Germany as OSS agents to start and supply resistance 
groups, bring back intelligence about industries, and commit acts of sabotage. Yet before 
any such action could occur, the German laborers first provided lists of underground 
labor resistance leaders still active in Germany. These names and their corresponding 
“safe addresses” eventually allowed for Germans and other OSS agents safely to 
penetrate the Reich.
43
 The German laborers in Britain, by giving names and addresses of 
safe contacts in Germany, provided the Labor Branch with vital information without 
which the penetration of Germany would have been impossible.   
The Labor Branch was also the first branch to consider how Allied agents would 
get into Germany and what they would do once they had established themselves. These 
plans date to early in the Branch’s history, well before any other branch of the OSS or 
British intelligence had thoroughly considered trying to get information out of the 
German Reich. The first mention of a possible means of getting OSS Labor agents into 
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the German heartland was in January 1943. Arthur Goldberg, now based in Washington, 
D.C., wrote to Pratt in London: “we would like to know…whether it is not possible to set 
up a courier system back and forth between France and Germany through the medium of 
French workers who go to Germany” as part of the German forced-labor program.
44
 The 
workers would go in on foot, collect information on the factory in which they worked and 
the surrounding areas, and, on their return to France, pass information to an OSS agent 
already established there.
45
 After some consideration, Goldberg and Pratt recognized this 
as a very feasible option: there were numerous French workers willing to report back 
against the Germans,
46
 the OSS had means of communicating into and out of France, and 
such an operation would require little training of the French agents. They thus began 
campaigning for approval for the mission. 
Goldberg went to Donovan with his branch’s idea about using French workers to 
get intelligence out of Germany and was rebuffed. There were a couple of reasons for the 
upper-level dismissal of the Labor Branch’s early overtures about using alien laborers to 
retrieve intelligence from Germany. The major one was the lack of trust that the US 
government and public alike had towards groups with communist leanings, including 
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labor groups. This was due to the U. S. government’s tendency to associate labor groups 
with Communism. Of course, labor groups were what the Labor Branch worked with, and 
as a result, few in the OSS respected it or the relationships it had formed with labor 
circles. “Most OSS staff, if they knew anything at all about the existence of the Labor 
Division, merely tolerated or ignored it.”
 47
 This outlook of mistrust would continue after 
the war, especially by the Central Intelligence Agency, which succeeded the OSS. Unlike 
the OSS’ Labor Branch, which reached out to labor organizations and used their 
assistance to make the infiltration of Germany possible, CIA-labor relations centered on 
the CIA attempting to quiet labor organizations and prevent them from gaining influence 
in any portion of the world. This left-wing against right-wing struggle, seen in the Labor 
Branch’s efforts to get approval to work with labor movements, was dominated by the 
right-wing by the end of the war, a tradition that continues in the CIA today.
48
 
With anti-communist sentiments growing in the United States, the Labor Branch 
was not immune to these feelings. Indeed, until late 1944, the Labor Branch itself took 
pains to work with socialists, avoiding Communists whenever possible.
49
 This changed in 
October 1944, when Bill Donovan, now realizing how desperate the need to get into 
Germany was becoming, said, “I’d put Stalin himself on the OSS payroll if I thought it 
would help defeat Hitler.” David Bruce, who was chief of the OSS in London, concurred 
in principle that the OSS should use every possible resource to gain intelligence on or 
access to Germany. The Labor Branch then received formal authorization to use 
                                                 
47 Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler, 168-169. 
48 Winslow Peck, “The AFL-CIA,” in Howard Frazier, ed., Uncloaking the CIA (New York: The 
Free Press, 1975), 238-241.  
49 United States State Department. OSS/London: Special Operations Branch and Secret 
Intelligence Branch War Diaries, 8 microfilm reels (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of 
America, 1985), reel 7, vol. 6, pg. 237, hereafter OSS/London War Diary. 
  29 
Communists in their infiltration campaign, a move that would be essential in their 
success.
50
  
This did not, however, mean that the use of Communists by the OSS was common 
knowledge. Indeed, on March 15, 1945 an article appeared in the New York Times with 
the headline, “Denies Reds are in OSS: Donovan Says the Agency Bars Men with 
Subversive Views.” The article read, in part,  
 
William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, an 
investigative and interjurative agency operated by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, denied today that there are any Communists and fascists in that 
organization…. “I have never taken in any man of whom I have even a 
doubt,” Mr. Donovan said, adding that the OSS was very careful and that 
since he alone was responsible for the men in the OSS, all doubtful cases 
were referred personally to him.
51
 
 
The article attempted to refute rumors that Communists had infiltrated the OSS and were 
running missions, which caused a public uproar. So powerful were these rumors that the 
article mentioned above ran in newspapers around the world. This shows the growing 
public unease with Communism, which is why, as late as March, 1945, Donovan and the 
government publicly denied the use of Communists within the OSS. The role of 
Communists in the OSS remains an issue to this day, with former German Communist 
OSS agents’ families having to fight for years to obtain the military decorations for which 
their family members had been recommended.
52
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There was another reason the Labor Branch’s overtures about infiltration were 
ignored early on. The British, while they had established and maintained relations with 
German labor groups, had made no efforts to use these connections as a means of getting 
the best intelligence possible, straight from the Reich itself. They had deemed the 
infiltration of the Reich impossible by any means very early in the war, and did not 
seriously think of it anymore. While occasionally the British intelligence agencies would 
mention teaming up with OSS to make arrangements for penetration, such overtures 
rarely went beyond a few early discussions. One must also remember that the British had 
access to Ultra, the German top-secret intelligence code that the British had cracked.
 53
 
While the OSS was privy to very little Ultra-based intelligence, by 1943 it seems that the 
upper-level staff of the OSS agreed with the British that penetrating Germany was not 
likely, and continued to ignore the Labor Branch’s pushes for infiltration. 
Social elements may also have played a part in upper echelons of the OSS 
overlooking the Labor Branch early on. As the OSS counted baseball stars, actors, 
safecrackers, scientists, tycoons, and socialites amongst its ranks, the Labor Branch 
tended to be a little less flashy and more reserved. While Labor Branch staff certainly had 
the credentials as powerful attorneys and scholars, they did not work in the most 
glamorous arena, were not known outside the labor world, and as such may have been 
overlooked.
54
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Yet, the Labor Branch was not to be dissuaded from what it saw as a great 
opportunity to get intelligence from within enemy territory. In a February 1943 memo 
Goldberg tried once more to convince Donovan of labor movements’ utility and value: 
Very early in the work of the Office of Strategic Services it was 
recognized that the labor movements in Axis and occupied countries were 
important allies in the common struggle against the Axis powers…they 
constituted the bulwark of the movements of resistance. Although their 
organizations were dissolved, they nevertheless waged an unremitting 
struggle underground….We are entering upon a period of the war in which 
it becomes more important than ever to capitalize upon the forces of 
internal resistance behind enemy lines. 
 
Successfully entering into action with these groups, whether via contact with French 
workers or some other way, Goldberg continued, would “mean much in the shortening of 
the war and in the lessening of our casualties. They will also mean much in the 
restoration…of democratic institutions” which the underground and exiled labor 
movements had pledged to reestablish. Yet Donovan and other top-level staffers 
remained unconvinced of the necessity of using the Labor Branch, or any branch for that 
matter, to get information out of the Reich.
55
 
 With the OSS chiefs leery of trusting anyone involved in labor movements and 
having seemingly shoved the possibility of infiltrating Germany out of their minds, the 
Labor Branch staffers were left alone to do what they could, in the hopes that, at some 
point in the course of the war, they would have the opportunity to prove their worth. 
While other OSS branches continued to send agents into France, Switzerland, and 
Turkey, the Labor Branch kept coming up with plans to get into Germany. They 
continued gathering safe addresses, recruited German prisoners of war as agents, readied 
foreign workers to establish underground resistance groups in Germany, and planned 
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missions to parachute agents into Germany to spread propaganda, send back radio 
communications, and sabotage German factories. These plans required establishing cover 
stories and documents for recruited agents, training the recruits, and determining where 
each agent would best operate. This planning process, though ignored for over a year by 
the Labor Branch’s administrative superiors, would eventually prove crucial to the 
successful penetration of Germany. 
One example of the planning that was underway in 1943 can be seen in the Labor 
Branch based in Algiers. Under the direction of Gerhard Van Arkel, the Algiers’ Labor 
Desk took the first steps towards recruiting Germans suitable for infiltration. Recruiting 
from German prisoners held by the British, the Branch, by the beginning of September 
1943, had placed seventeen POW agents in training in and around Algiers. The Labor 
desk in Algiers indeed became so active in German operations that it was unofficially 
known as the “German Labor Desk.”
56
   
In spite of this planning and training, the OSS and Allied military commands were 
unwilling in 1943 and most of 1944 to attempt any sort of infiltration of Germany, 
especially if it involved using German prisoners to do so. This attitude would change a 
few months after the Normandy invasion, when the OSS and Allied military commanders 
realized the invasion had not ended the war as they had expected. That is to say, 
immediately following the invasion in June of 1944, the American and British armed 
force commanders and the public alike suffered from a so-called “victory fever,” 
expecting the war to simply wrap up on French soil as a result of an “imminent” German 
collapse. Of course, this did not happen. While France fell relatively quickly to the Allied 
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invaders, the German army was able to re-form its lines on the western borders of 
Germany and prepare for a counterattack.
57
 Yet the Allies continued to underestimate the 
German resolve and overestimate their own military impact. As late as August 1944, 
intelligence officers in the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) “had no specific intelligence objectives within Germany and…had not done 
any planning for tactical intelligence inside Germany.” Nor was the OSS in any mood for 
talk of German penetration—by this point, Donovan was more concerned about what 
would become of OSS after the war and how to see out the remainder of the war on a 
shrinking budget.
58
 
  By September 1944, the Allies recognized that Germany was not on the verge of 
collapse as they had imagined. The realization dawned on Donovan and his OSS and 
military counterparts that, without intelligence from inside Germany itself, the war might 
drag on endlessly.
59
 Now they were left with the question of how such a seemingly 
impossible task could be done; after all, the OSS upper-level staff and British intelligence 
had been saying for years that it could not and did not need to happen, that the risks were 
too great, that German security was too good. The internal divisions in the OSS, which 
were inherent ever since its inception and arrangement into a web of divisions, branches, 
groups, and subunits, finally became operationally apparent. When it came to one of the 
most crucial moments of the war, when Germany refused to collapse, there was only one 
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branch in the entire OSS organization that had consistently prepared for the possibility of 
sending intelligence teams into the German heartland: the Labor Branch.
60
 
Fortunately for Donovan and the Labor Branch, senior level OSS staff had finally 
started to recognize the Branch’s value. William Casey, the OSS London Secretariat and 
future director of the CIA, was the first high-level OSS staff member to call openly for 
the infiltration of Germany based on the Labor Branch’s accomplishments and the insight 
they had gained over the past two years. As Casey recalled after the war, “the labor desk 
people were the only people who had any preparation for working into Germany. We had 
to turn to them to get information about the controls, the rationing, how the hell to stay 
alive.”
61
 In August 1944, during a trip through the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations, 
Casey commented on the Labor Branch: 
These fellows here as in ETO [European Theatre of Operations] seem to 
have shown more forward planning and recruiting for the penetration of 
Germany than anybody else….I like the way the Labor Desk is integrated 
into the Central European Division at Bari. They run their operations 
jointly or in close collaboration with the appropriate geographic desk. 
 
Casey reported that the Labor Branch had fashioned itself into the model branch of the 
OSS: they worked in conjunction with other agencies and branches and were willing to 
share information they obtained with other groups in the OSS and other Allies’ 
intelligence services.
62
 This kept the Labor Branch apprised of military, political, social, 
and economic developments across Europe and especially in Germany and, as a result, 
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made it the only branch prepared to infiltrate the Reich. Casey would thus become one of 
the Labor Branch’s greatest supporters and help to make it a central component of the 
OSS, finally opening his co-workers’ minds to the value of labor groups in intelligence. 
While Casey alone was not responsible for the infiltration of Germany, his support for the 
Labor Branch’s plans did propel those plans into action. In short, Casey demonstrated the 
power of the perceptive individual in a bureaucracy.  
Two days before Casey sent the above memo, the Labor Branch finally received 
approval from the OSS and SHAEF to send teams into the Reich. This plan, code named 
Faust (after Johann Goethe’s famed literary character), had been in the planning stages 
since October 1943. The agents involved were all recruited by Arthur Goldberg and his 
staff, spoke fluent German, and had “experience in underground activities in Germany” 
and contacts with “anti-Nazi groups.”
63
 The first Faust mission to be deployed was called 
Downend and involved the very first OSS agent (and Allied agent in general) to infiltrate 
Germany.  
  Downend reflected the ways in which the Labor Branch was able to prove its 
worth and served as an example for future mission planning. Launched on September 1, 
1944, Downend parachuted Jupp Kappius into the industrial Ruhr region of northwest 
Germany (see Appendix, Fig. 2). He was a German émigré forced to flee Germany with 
his wife in 1937. As active members of the International Socialist Militant League, an 
extremist socialist group that believed capitalism to be morally wrong, they were among 
the first to be persecuted by the Nazis and seek freedom elsewhere.
64
 Kappius had found 
                                                 
63 Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler, 179. 
64 Kappius was so opposed to capitalism that, when he was recruited by the OSS, he would only 
accept five pounds per week to cover his living expenses; he refused to accept a wage. See Persico, 
Piercing the Reich, 75.  
  36 
the socialist and labor circles in London welcoming, and was quickly seen by Goldberg 
and the others in the Labor Branch as a reliable and trustworthy anti-Nazi. As a result, 
Kappius was recruited by the London Labor Branch in 1943.  
Kappius’s mission objectives were extensive and would be difficult for one man 
to carry out alone: “you will create an underground organization for the purpose of (1) 
promoting internal resistance to the Nazi regime; (2) committing acts of sabotage against 
the war effort; (3) encouraging subversion in all its forms.”
65
 Nonetheless, Kappius 
hurled himself out of a Royal Air Force plane around midnight on September 1, 1944, 
and set about his assignment. After landing in a field, Kappius buried his parachute, took 
a two-hour nap, and then caught a train to his hometown of Bochum. Once here he 
located his safe house, home of a young ISK couple; while associating with known ISK 
members posed a risk to Kappius and the mission, the Labor Branch had no other option 
when setting up the safe address. From this location he began making contacts in local 
labor circles.
66
 
Despite the odds stacked against him (being the first Allied agent to infiltrate 
Germany, operating alone in the Nazi heartland, associating with known socialists—the 
list goes on), Kappius succeeded in his mission to a remarkable degree. In the seven 
months between his landing and his being overrun by the U. S. Army 
He organized a group of seven men, each of whom had contact with two 
to five other men, who were shop stewards or union organizers in the 
Ruhr. He established sources in Essen and Witten also, including the 
director of a mining firm, a director of the Deutschebank, and a high 
official in Krupp. These men were used to collect information, pass on 
propaganda, and foster slow-downs and sabotage….He gained information 
also from ISK couriers from Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Goettingen, 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 76-77. 
  37 
Kassel, Darmstadt, Ulm, and Frankfurt-am-Main.
67
 
 
Unfortunately, because of communication difficulties, much of the information Kappius 
gleaned from his contacts was not available to the Allies and the OSS until after he was 
assimilated behind U. S. front lines.  
Kappius had trouble getting information to his OSS handlers because at this point 
in time there were few reliable options for sending out information via radio or 
telegraph.
68
 Instead, in the early OSS infiltration missions into Germany, the agents had 
to rely on couriers to shuttle messages back and forth between the agent and OSS 
officers, usually located in a neutral country. Kappius had two courier agents, Kappius’ 
wife Anne and another woman, Hilde Meisel. The couriers infiltrated Germany on foot 
via the Swiss border, made their way to Kappius in the Ruhr (a distance of a few hundred 
miles), and then returned with parcels of information to Switzerland. They only made this 
trip twice, but along the way Anne Kappius also managed to gain information from other 
labor resistance members. In essence, however, Jupp Kappius carried out most his 
resistance work out of contact with the Allies.  
While the OSS did not receive copious amounts of information from Kappius, the 
information it did receive about industrial strength, manufacturing, underground groups, 
and troop movements was promising. More importantly, the Labor Branch had proven 
that Germany could be penetrated. While there were glitches, most notably with 
communications into and out of the Reich, Kappius had not been captured; on the 
contrary, he had managed to blend into the populace with little apparent difficulty and set 
up a network of internal spies and saboteurs. These achievements were highly significant 
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and encouraged the Labor Branch and the OSS to prepare for an onslaught of infiltration 
missions. 
During Kappius’s deployment, William Casey was so impressed with the Labor 
Branch’s ability to work with other branches and organizations and their success in 
infiltrating the Reich that he began to push for the rearrangement of the Secret 
Intelligence Division in the Labor Branch’s image and under its tutelage, at least when it 
came to infiltration operations. Casey recognized that, if the penetration of Germany was 
to succeed, intra-agency cooperation like that seen in the Labor Branch would be needed, 
but on a larger scale. As early as September 1944, Casey recommended appointing a 
single geographic authority for the infiltration of Germany, establishing a separate 
penetration task force using all branch resources, and designating someone to run the 
recruiting drive for agents capable of infiltration missions.
69
 
Then, in November 1944, the Secret Intelligence Division was reconstructed. 
Now called the Division of Intelligence Procurement (DIP) 
the Labor Desk nucleus which had been assembled over a period of two 
years by George O. Pratt was given direction of the SI [Secret 
Intelligence] German program…it was placed in charge of all SI London 
Desks, Air Operations, Bach Unit, and the Labor Desk field missions….In 
addition, R&D [Research and Development], responsible for equipping 
agents, and C&D Branch [Censorship and Documents], responsible for 
manufacturing documents, were to work full-time for DIP.
70
  
 
This group would coordinate all Secret Intelligence resources in London and direct and 
control all penetration operations. No longer were there to be a multitude of branches 
working on disjointed intelligence operations. Instead, like the Labor Branch, which had 
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pooled its resources with other branches and stepped outside its role of gathering labor 
intelligence and into the realm of planning operations in foreign countries, the DIP would 
coordinate and consolidate as many areas tied to secret intelligence as possible and use 
their combined strengths to get into Nazi Germany.
71
 
Not surprisingly, the first OSS missions under DIP direction into Germany had 
strong Labor Branch connections: the Labor Branch had recruited or trained the agents, 
designed their cover stories, or determined their mission objectives.
72
 In any case, the 
Labor Branch had clearly laid the foundation for German infiltration by obtaining 
information from POWs, German exiles, and American agents, as well as training these 
individuals to enter Germany. As with the Downend mission, all further missions had 
their ups and downs. As technology improved, couriers gave way to the wireless 
telegraph, which in turn gave way to Joan/Eleanor, a high frequency radio transmitter 
which enabled more agents to get more information out of Germany. As pilots and agents 
gained confidence and experience, their rates of successful parachute drops improved. 
The first operative who reached Berlin even managed to establish himself within the 
ranks of the Nazi Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Service. The OSS had done what upper-
level officials had once thought impossible: entered the enemy’s heartland and infiltrated 
a key organ of the German fascist state.
73
  
Overall, the losses incurred by OSS agents in Germany were far lower than 
expected. The total casualty rate of all Secret Intelligence teams run from London 
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(including those directed by the Labor Branch) ran under 5 percent, admirable 
considering that nearly 200 agents entered the Reich.
74
 Some agents, however, found 
themselves in difficult and sometimes deadly situations. The Dubuque agent was killed in 
action the day after he crossed the German border. The two agents on the Fat mission 
went missing as soon as they arrived and were never heard from again, and Alphonse was 
“caught on landing and lost.”
75
 On a mission unrelated to Downend (which she served on 
as a courier to Jupp Kappius), Hilde Meisel was shot in the legs by a German policeman 
as she attempted to reenter Switzerland from Austria; before the Germans reached her she 
bit into her cyanide capsule and died instantly.
76
   
While most agents survived and were recovered during or after the war, they did 
not achieve high rates of success in passing information to the OSS while they were in 
Germany. Of eighty-five attempted contacts with teams using the Joan/Eleanor 
equipment, the OSS made successful connections 45 percent of the time. Success rates 
with wireless telegraph technology were even lower.
 77
 Agents who went in as so-called 
tourists also faced dangers crossing enemy lines and repatriating themselves to the Allies. 
They were often overrun by advancing Allied forces before they could gather useful 
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information.
78
 There simply were no easy means of communicating out of Germany, and 
that remained the OSS’ biggest challenge.
79
   
In general, scholars agree that the intelligence the OSS obtained through the 
penetration of Germany was limited. No agents returned with shocking news: no secret 
weapons were found, no mountain fortress was discovered, and Hitler was not kidnapped 
or attacked. But the pieces of information OSS agents managed to smuggle out did help 
the war effort. Reports on troop location, war materiel production, home front morale: all 
of these seemingly miniscule details, when taken together, armed the Allies with new 
targets for bombing attacks, better preparation for impending German counteroffensives, 
and a generally improved understanding of the enemy homeland. There is general 
agreement that OSS actions inside the Reich shortened the duration of the war and 
lessened casualties on both sides, and the sheer ability of the OSS to get into the German 
heartland at all is widely acknowledged as a major espionage triumph.
80
 
Yet very little attention has been paid to the role of the Labor Branch in all of this. 
This is likely due to the Labor Branch’s suspected Communist links and the desire by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (which succeeded the OSS) to keep any connection of U. S. 
government agencies, defunct or otherwise, to Communist organizations from becoming 
common knowledge. The fact that the Labor Branch did not have any famous actors, 
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baseball players, or scientists on its staff also caused historians to overlook it. Instead, 
prominent intelligence scholars focus on the role of the individual in the success of the 
infiltration. Some, like Christof Mauch, have claimed that Bill Donovan, as overall chief 
of the OSS, was responsible for the penetration, while Joseph Persico and Nelson 
MacPherson argue that William Casey enabled the infiltration and should receive full 
credit for the successes. In contrast, my research has shown that the triumph of 
infiltration simply did not belong to one man alone, as that is not how the Labor Branch 
operated. Instead, it belongs to a group of individuals, including Germans, Americans, 
socialists, Communists, labor leaders, analysts, and activists, who worked together in the 
Labor Branch to do the impossible. 
My argument that a group of people were responsible for the infiltration also 
reveals that the infiltration simply could not have happened had the Labor Branch not 
organized itself the way it did. Its organization and methods, rather than its focus on 
labor, was the true cause of the Labor Branch’s success, and also the foundation for its 
lasting legacy in the American intelligence community. It is important to remember that 
the CIA and FBI throughout the Cold War and even today view with derision organized 
labor, as upper-level OSS officers did. The CIA and FBI have carried out actions against 
organized labor, and there is an undercurrent of suspicion among the American public 
about certain unions and how powerful they should be.
81
 Hence, the Labor Branch’s 
methods had a far greater impact than its subject. Indeed, its influence was so great that 
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an entire division of the OSS was rearranged in its image, and the methods of the 
Branch’s Bach Section are practiced to this day.
82
  
The ability of the Labor Branch’s staff to work with other branches and desks, 
their early understanding of the situation and attitudes of German labor exiles, their 
ability to adapt to the changing needs of the OSS, and above all, their persistent 
insistence that infiltration was possible made the Labor Branch of the OSS the force of 
success behind the infiltration of Germany. Without them, the penetration of Nazi 
Germany would never have been organized, let alone achieved.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Bach Section 
 
 As has been shown, the infiltration of Germany in 1944 by the Office of Strategic 
Services was primarily the achievement of the OSS’s Labor Branch. The Labor Branch, 
from its bases in London, Algiers, Switzerland, Bari, and elsewhere, had focused on 
getting into Germany relatively early in the war. It had utilized connections with labor 
groups throughout Europe to advance its mission of penetrating the Reich. However, in 
its earliest phases, the Labor Branch had no viable way of enabling its agents to survive 
in Germany as spies. In 1943, even if the brass at OSS had approved a mission into 
Germany and provided an aircraft or other means of entry, the agent would have been 
without a viable cover story, documents, or understanding of day-to-day life in Germany. 
This situation was not rectified until the OSS created the Bach Section on 1 April 1944 as 
part of the London Labor Branch. Bach, with its small collection of experts on German 
language, culture, economics, history, and politics, as well as detail-oriented intelligence 
officers, was able to build up the OSS’s first comprehensive library of intelligence on 
Germany. From this, Bach became the section through which most agents entering 
Germany were provided with cover stories, identification papers, and the minute details 
they would need to blend into everyday life in the Reich. Together with its parent, the 
Labor Branch, the Bach Section made the infiltration of Germany possible. The two also 
conjoined in influencing the organization of the OSS’s successor, the CIA. 
           When OSS established the Bach section in April 1944, its immediate aim was to 
serve the cover, documentation, and briefing needs of the London Labor Section, which 
at that point was in the early planning stages of missions to infiltrate Germany. By that 
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time, OSS London’s main Censorship and Documents Division had not done any serious 
work on analyzing and forging German documents, obtaining clothing and accessories, or 
creating viable cover stories for life in Germany. Meanwhile, the Research and Analysis 
Branch in London had done research on Germany, but mainly by way of gathering 
biographical information on selected Germans, producing studies on the German air-raid 
defenses, and creating some economic reports that were valuable to the military but not to 
those working to covertly enter Germany.
83
 With the lack of gritty details needed to make 
infiltration of Germany possible, the men at the top of the Labor Branch realized the 
critical need for a group devoted solely to preparing spies for life inside Nazi Germany.  
            Indeed, in 1943, under London Labor Branch chief George Pratt’s direction, 
Isaiah Sol Dorfman, a Labor Branch staffer, started gathering information to be used for 
briefing agents. Dorfman, however, could only give some of his time to researching life 
in Germany, as he was also working with German labor refugees and exiles in London. 
He did make enough headway to open his superiors’ eyes to the fact that more detailed 
research on Germany would be essential to their aims of infiltrating the Reich.
84
  
 In a memorandum by Pratt dated 28 April 1943, one begins to see the early 
realization by the upper levels of the Labor Branch in London that intelligence could and 
should be gathered on Germany: “…the experience of 5 months in London has 
demonstrated that there exist actual present sources of information, and a large potential 
if properly organized. So far, such information has been largely economic and political in 
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its nature with a goodly sprinkling of information as to factors affecting morale and 
civilian life.”
85
 It was up to Dorfmann to supplement and improve this intelligence. 
By February 1944, Dorfmann made progress in his research into Germany while 
realizing the limitations of his one man project. On 4 February, he responded to a request 
by the director of the OSS, William Donovan, to compose a memorandum discussing the 
early brainstorming for infiltrating Germany. Dorfmann’s early plans called for recruiting 
people  
who themselves at one time participated in underground work in 
Germany. Agents recruited on the continent from among trade union 
resistance groups will, of course, know well the areas of operation, the 
living conditions, and the practices and procedures of underground work. 
Their instruction therefore will be of a more summary nature; mainly 
briefing, the essentials of communication, military reporting and means of 
entering Germany.
86
 
 
Later experience proved that the hope of using agents recruited “on the continent” would 
be difficult, as those who had worked in trade union resistance groups had fled long 
before 1944. Instead, most prospective agents actually were contacted in Britain. The 
German agents that were found in Britain, in contrast to the hopes expressed in 
Dorfmann’s memo, required more than “summary” instruction. Most of the trade 
unionists that the Labor Desk and Bach Section worked with had been outside of 
Germany for many years and had little knowledge of current living conditions, 
regulations, and controls in Germany. Yet this pre-Bach memo to Donovan shows that 
Dorfmann, and the rest of the Labor Desk in London, seriously began to prepare for 
covert infiltration of Germany. 
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In the same memo, Dorfmann referred to the need for cover and documentation 
that any infiltration of Germany would require. “Necessary German papers vary, of 
course, with the cover employed. The following, among others, will be especially helpful: 
Arbeitsbuch, ration book, special traveler’s food stamps…We are attempting to obtain 
originals of these and other documents to facilitate their reproduction for use by our 
agents.”
87
 This excerpt provides an interesting insight into the state of the Labor Desk’s 
preparedness in February 1944 to go into Germany. That is, they knew that they needed 
such papers, but did not yet have the papers or even a definite means of obtaining them. 
Clearly there was much groundwork left to do. 
Dorfmann’s memo provides one final glimpse at how the Labor Branch sought to 
penetrate Germany but how limited its actual preparation was. In a section of the memo 
entitled “Activities inside Germany,” Dorfmann stated correctly that the degree of 
freedom an agent would have in moving about Germany depended on the type of cover 
that agent was provided. Dorfmann then explained that travel on local trains in Germany 
for distances less than 30 kilometers was “relatively free of official supervision. An agent 
could travel for considerable distances, but only about 30 kilometers on any one ticket.”
88
 
He had no way of telling Donovan how such a limitation might be overcome, and instead 
tried to make it sound as if the solution to travel restrictions in Germany was to have 
agents make very short trips on a great number of tickets, which would have been 
impractical. He also implied that agents would only work in a limited geographic area. 
However, because the Labor Branch was pushing for agents to be infiltrated both on foot 
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and by parachute, it seems logical that land travel over distances greater then 30 
kilometers would be required.    
The memo discussed above demonstrates that, while the Labor Branch staff had 
started to make initial investigations into how to get into Germany, their thinking and 
planning were still limited. Yet the fact that Donovan had requested such a memo be sent 
to him showed that the Labor Branch’s efforts, though limited by manpower and time, 
were being taken seriously at the top level of the OSS.  
As a result, Lazare Teper, formerly of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers 
Union and in 1944 working with the Labor Branch in London, set up an office committed 
to researching day-to-day life, government restrictions, and transportation in Germany. 
This became the Bach Section, taking the name of Teper’s favorite composer.
89
 Teper 
was immediately appointed chief of the section. Henry Sutton, who before the war had 
worked on a major labor research project in New York, worked alongside Teper, helped 
him create the professional research office devoted to Germany, and was Bach Section’s 
assistant chief. As of 1 April 1944, Teper and Sutton’s goal was to gather sufficient 
intelligence to make possible the briefing and preparation of agents for successful 
German infiltration. 
Before examining how Bach prepared agents and their cover stories, the structural 
organization of Bach Section must be discussed. Doing so allows one to understand its 
role and place in the OSS, its connection to the Labor Branch, and the two groups’ 
influence on the OSS’s successor, the CIA. As mentioned, Teper and Sutton were already 
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in London and connected to the Labor Branch when they were assigned to Bach. Initially, 
they were the only two members of Bach’s staff. Both had extensive labor as well as 
research experience and could use these skills in their work for Bach. However, as the 
Labor Branch began to expect more and more detailed information about life in 
Germany, Teper and Sutton were overwhelmed and requested more staff be hired. By the 
end of 1944, Bach’s staff had grown from its original two members to eleven full-time 
staff and two paid consultants. Typical requirements of these workers were a good 
knowledge of the German language, research experience, a high IQ, and background 
knowledge of Germany, its culture, heritage, and history.
90
 These requirements reduced 
the need for on-the-job training of staff and greatly speeded up the time frame in which 
new staff could become effective members of Bach. In this way, Bach reflected the 
OSS’s tendency to hire individuals who were ready and able to begin working on a task 
immediately, with little intermediate training required. 
 By the end of 1944, Bach Section experienced an extreme demand for 
information on Germany, as well as for covers and documentation by a variety of groups, 
both in the OSS and outside. Naturally, the London Labor Branch called on Bach to meet 
its needs, but so did the OSS’s Secret Intelligence (SI) and Special Operations divisions 
in London. Even OSS Labor Branches based outside London hounded Bach for materials. 
Gerhard van Arkel, part of the Labor Branch staff in Bern, Switzerland, in December 
1944 requested blanks of forged German papers and documents to speed up his office’s 
ability to penetrate Germany. George Pratt responded that 
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…the reluctance on this end to send blank documents was due to the fact 
that we had never had a clear, complete picture of what the situation was 
and/or just how the documents would be used or the facilities you had 
there to fill them in properly, and suggested that the only solution I could 
think of was to send a person from either Bach or C&D for a period of two 
to four weeks to familiarize himself with the situation….I am trying to 
arrange it. So far there is a question of the usual lack of personnel. There 
is no one we can spare at the moment for this assignment.
91
 
 
The British Special Operations Executive and Secret Intelligence Service also placed 
orders for briefing of their staff and agents, as well as documents.
92
 Clearly, the Bach 
Section was swamped with a volume of requests that they could not handle even with a 
full-time staff of eleven. More importantly, Bach began to expand beyond the Labor 
Branch. It now became responsive to both internal OSS neighbors and also those of 
Allied forces, revealing its respect amongst other branches and its many talents. 
With this overwhelming demand for materials and the shortage of personnel, 
Bach needed to rearrange itself so as to allow it to work to its full potential. Thus, when 
an Secret Intelligence (SI) order in November 1944 reorganized SI London into the 
Division of Intelligence Procurement (DIP), Bach was no longer a subsection of the 
Labor Branch but a section all its own, known as the Briefing Division of the DIP. This 
led to even more work, and by 28 April 1945, the personnel of Bach numbered 28. At the 
end of the war in Europe, Bach had three executive officers (including Teper and Sutton), 
eight briefers, two document analysts, seven members of the research unit, four people 
working strictly with the library and files of the division, and four secretaries and 
translators.
93
 Together, these men and women worked to find, organize, and use any 
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information, no matter how tedious or insignificant it may have seemed, to prepare for 
covert entry into Germany. 
The information that Bach needed to gather in order to prepare agents adequately 
to enter Germany did not fall within the realm of typical wartime intelligence gathering 
like troop movements and weapons capabilities. Instead, Bach staff looked for 
“authoritative information on laws, regulations, customs and requirements regarding 
every occupation, male or female, which might be a useful cover for the intelligence 
activities of the Labor Division.”
94
 Bach was interested in understanding how documents 
and identity papers were examined and circulated, what the rationing system was, what 
types of jobs men and women would be expected to hold, which jobs allowed for travel, 
and how to mail a letter in the Reich. They wanted to know about particular towns, if and 
when areas had been bombed by the Allies, and the state of factories and companies. All 
of this type of information was critical in creating reliable cover stories.  
            These minute details were also the type of information that the Central 
Intelligence Agency, formed after President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS in late 
1945, would gather. Interestingly, this was the type of intelligence that U. S. spy groups 
had previously frowned upon gathering, in the spirit of Henry Stimson’s famed line, 
“Gentlemen don’t read each others’ mail.” In fact, this nosing around in other nations’ 
business, gathering minute details and then using it to the United States’ political 
advantage, became one of the central aspects of the CIA. Bach and the Labor Branch laid 
the groundwork for a new realm of American intelligence gathering and use.
95
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When Bach was first formed, Teper and Sutton had a few sources from which to 
begin compiling this kind of information on Germany. Naturally, there was the material 
that I. S. Dorfmann gathered in 1943 and early 1944. As mentioned, however, this was a 
limited amount of material and more would definitely be needed before any sort of 
attempt to penetrate Germany could commence. Thus they also started with source 
material already available in London, especially that which had been gathered by the 
Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the British Foreign Office. From this 
collection Teper and Sutton used miscellaneous reports and studies to acquaint 
themselves with Germany and the current way of life there. Newspaper clippings from 
Germany and enemy-occupied territories proved exceptionally helpful as well. Every day 
the PID put out a 50-page News Digest of all politically interesting items appearing in a 
variety of German newspapers two to four days earlier. This proved to be an invaluable 
source in learning about the location of prisoner of war camps, rationing systems, and 
general matters like what people were doing in their free time.
96
 Similarly, Bach accessed 
a number of small-town German papers, which were less heavily controlled by the Nazis; 
these often provided a more accurate insight into the morale of the local population as 
opposed to being filled with propaganda.
97
  
 The Bach section early on relied on other British resources as well. Ministry of 
Economic Warfare reports, the Military Intelligence Research Section of the British War 
Office’s captured documents collection, and the Ministry of Information’s regular library 
all were rich resources when Bach was first establishing its own library of information.
98
 
Soon, however, Bach section staff made their own headway in research on Germany. 
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They found the interrogation of German soldiers and civilians exceptionally useful. Teper 
would personally visited the prisoner of war camps in Britain and found that most 
captured soldiers, while reluctant to speak about military affairs, usually did not mind 
answering questions about daily life in Germany and their particular town. From this 
Bach was able to learn how easy or difficult travel was, how and when papers were 
checked, where people greeted one another with “Heil Hitler” as opposed to a more 
traditional greeting, and the other minutiae that Bach needed to get agents integrated into 
German life as safely and thoroughly as possible.
99
 Another commonly used source was 
telephone books, for they showed what addresses were still in use, where local 
government offices and agencies were, and a multitude of other details that would be 
crucial in devising cover stories.
100
 
 As the war progressed and the Allies became more firmly entrenched on the 
European continent, Bach gave assignments to OSS staff attached to various Allied 
armies to collect the type of intelligence Bach required. One area of particular need was 
the physical documents and papers the OSS agents would need to live in Germany. Bach 
Section thus created lists of documents that they wanted to procure and relied on the SI 
field army units to get them. Another area that Bach was lacking in was the information 
necessary to prepare female agents; field agents were asked to secure both identification 
documents and information: 
Identity papers; what feminine occupations are considered war-essential; 
German women serving in the armed forces and the auxiliary 
organizations; status of women in the public and private welfare 
institutions in Germany; jobs entitling women to travel in and outside 
Germany; employment of women in transportation and communication 
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facilities; and details about women’s wear and apparel including 
underwear and accessories.
101
  
 
That Teper himself requested this information for his unit demonstrates the lengths to 
which Bach went in order to ensure that its agents be as well-prepared as possible, and 
also the fact that they were preparing to have women agents participate in the infiltration. 
 From the information that they gleaned from newspapers, phone books, reports, 
interviews with prisoners, front-line OSS field agents, and other sources, the people in 
Bach Section could glean the minute but critical details that could make or break a 
mission. For example, early in its research Bach gained access to a study on the German 
postal system intended for a civil affairs officer. The study was supposed to allow an 
officer to “go to Berlin, walk into the office of the postmaster and run the German postal 
system.”
102
 Yet this report provided absolutely no information on how to actually post a 
letter in Germany. Hence the report was of little value to Bach, but it did make clear that 
there were some intricate nuances of everyday life that they had to uncover before 
sending any mission into Germany. Bach eventually discovered that stamps could only be 
put on by a postal official, that letters going abroad required a special form from the 
police, and that padded envelopes were forbidden.
103
 Because agents, especially those 
engaged in the early infiltrations into Germany, were often told to use the mail system as 
a means of contacting their couriers, this information was crucial and removed yet 
another barrier standing between the OSS and getting its agents into Germany and 
helping them communicate effectively.  
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Other challenges faced Bach in creating the documents and identity papers that its 
agents required. For example, did the eagle stamped on a document face left or right? Did 
it matter which way the eagle faced? The Bach Section discovered that it certainly did 
matter, as a left-facing eagle indicated a Nazi party document, and right-facing meant it 
was a government document. A mistake on this sort of detail could cost a spy his life.
104
 
Bach also required that staff use German typewriters when filling in documents, that the 
photographs affixed to the papers were of the proper size and type of headshot, that 
documents were aged so that the papers looked as if they had been carried around for 
months or years, and that the types of inks used on documents were available and used in 
Germany.
105
 The Bach section also knew that any agent going to Germany would require 
an Arbeitsbuch, or work pass. This had to be forged, but Bach staff could not do it until 
they could figure out the geographical significance of a number code on the book. The 
code system could not be deciphered until they captured a complete set of instructions for 
the operation of the code. As a result, Bach sent out specific orders that all army officers 
place their soldiers on the lookout for work passes or anything related to them. This led to 
the capture of a key to the code system, and Bach was subsequently able to provide 
agents with a vital identification document that was accurate and would not arouse 
suspicion.
106
  
 All of these details were shared and exchanged between Bach and the Censorship 
and Documents Branch (CD) in London, which handled document and equipment 
intelligence. The two branches had a highly functional relationship: Bach usually secured 
the originals of documents to use as templates, kept a copy, and forwarded the original to 
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CD, although sometimes CD secured the original on its own. Whenever Bach staff 
needed a document, they called on CD operatives to fill out the necessary papers, 
instructing them line-by-line on how the document was to be completed. Thus CD would 
do the physical work on the papers—forging signatures, typing information, aging the 
papers, ensuring that the handwriting and typesetting were appropriate. Yet Bach 
provided all the details the CD needed to fill in the documents, i.e., the agent’s cover 
name, age, weight, height, and biographical details. Information provided to CD would 
also contain the name of the project, code name of the agent, and the date by which 
documents were needed. CD also required details on the German authority or office that 
would issue the document; the (forged) name of the official who should sign the 
document; the date of issue, taking care to ensure it was not dated from a Sunday or 
holiday; any numbers which corresponded to any code the German issuing authority 
might use; term of validity; and information on whether any fee or dues stamps needed to 
go on the document.
107
 Bach section had gathered all of this information and passed it on 
the CD every time they needed a document. 
 Bach called on CD for clothing and equipment as well, and this too had to be 
attended to with the utmost attention and care. Were the buttons on a shirt sewn on in the 
German way (criss-crossed) or American (parallel)? Clothing also had to properly fit an 
agent’s cover; a workman could not escape questioning if he wore a finely tailored suit as 
opposed to appropriate work clothes. These details could usually be overcome by issuing 
agents with articles of clothing directly from Germany. However, as more missions went 
into Germany, Bach had fewer clothes to choose from. As a result, in early 1945, an OSS 
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supply officer joined the First Army in Cologne in order to re-supply the CD section. He 
did this, obtaining suits, dresses, shoes, hats, cigarette lighters, underwear, tubes of 
toothpaste, and other assorted clothing and accessories. Altogether, his stash filled three 
C-47 airplanes, which he ordered back to London and used to outfit the remaining 
missions into Germany.
108
 
After the agents were fully equipped with documents and clothing, Bach once 
again assumed the main role in preparing them, making sure that the agents fitted the 
cover story.
109
 By necessity, the cover was created before any documents or clothing 
were ordered and followed a rigorous process. Before work on a cover could begin, Bach 
first needed to be provided with as much detail as possible about the agent, the nature of 
his mission, and, interestingly, the agent’s own ideas for his cover story. Details about the 
agent included a complete physical description, which incorporated nuances like age, 
height, weight, build, face shape, hair color, eye color, complexion, clothing 
measurements, and shoe size. The Bach Unit, in hopes of making some of their work 
simpler, required that any measurements be given in the “measurements and language of 
the target country.” Bach also sought to know all national characteristics, language 
peculiarities like dialects and odd pronunciation, distinguishing marks like scars or 
birthmarks, smoking habits, and any physical weaknesses or handicaps.
110
 
A biographical sketch of the agent was also essential when preparing his cover. 
Schooling, with details of any special training; domicile and travel, including a list of 
cities agents resided in for more than a few weeks; occupation, including line of business 
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of the firms for which the agent worked, the nature of the jobs held, and a full job 
description; service in any armies, including rank and branches of service; and the social 
environment of the agent (did he volunteer in his community, was he politically active, 
what circles did he move in?) were all types of details around which a false identity was 
created.
111
 The more that Bach knew about the agent’s previous life in Germany, what 
types of people he was most comfortable with, where he could move around without 
attracting too much attention, the better his chances for success. 
Bach administrators also requested that their cover creation staff be thoroughly 
briefed on the nature of the mission for which they were creating the cover. This included 
knowing the means of entry into the target country, where in the target country the 
mission was to originate, the amount of travel expected to be undertaken by the agent, 
and how long the mission was expected to last. They asked the agent’s handling officer, 
“Do the objectives of the mission require any special considerations in the make-up of a 
cover?” Bach also inquired about the social strata the agent would be expected to move 
in. The amount of time available to prepare cover and documents was another key issue 
for Bach, as the launch date for each mission dictated when documents and clothing 
needed to be ordered, and how soon a firm cover be established.
112
  
Bach did not simply take the information mentioned above about the agent and 
cobble together a cover. Instead, Bach actively sought the agent’s own ideas for his 
cover. “Does the agent have any preference for the role he is to play, or for the type of 
people with whom he is apt to feel most at ease? Agent’s ideas with regard to his cover 
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story will be given full consideration within the limit of practicality.”
 113
 Allowing the 
agent to express his thoughts about a cover accomplished several things. First, it gave 
Bach Section insight into how the agents thought and imagined themselves in their lives 
as secret agents, which in turn allowed Bach to make the cover stories sounder. Secondly, 
the agents often had excellent ideas for covers that Bach would never have imagined, as 
such ideas were usually unique to the individual agent’s own past and experience. This 
also helped prevent them from repeatedly recycling the same stories, though many covers 
were based on the same premise. Instead, by speaking with the agent directly, a more 
personalized cover could be created, and, more importantly, the agent would be more 
confident in his cover as he himself had played a role in devising it.  
All of this material was then used to write the first draft of a cover story that was 
quite broad and contained vague descriptions of what kind of job the agent would hold 
and a general idea of where he supposedly was from. Details only followed after taking 
into consideration the availability of papers, documents, clothes and other items that 
would be necessary to carry out the cover successfully. This occurred once an agent’s 
mission aims were finalized by the Branch running his operation. After all, a mission 
designed to last only three days did not require nearly as elaborate a cover as one 
intended to last three months. As the plan evolved and Bach gained a better 
understanding of the agent’s goal and target area, the agent would be given a new name, 
authentic address, a school and occupation history, even the color of the buses in the 
town the agent was supposedly from.
114
 As each stage of this cover preparation was 
completed, the agent was called in to review it with the people at Bach. This allowed the 
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agent to begin internalizing his cover early on as well as to be comfortable with it as it 
grew from a general overview to a specific, customized tale.
115
  
Once the cover was complete, the tedious process of fully briefing the agent 
began. By this point the agent would have already participated in a collective briefing, 
where all agents were informed of matters like rationing, police controls, and the Nazi 
party organization. The agent had to understand how Gestapo checkpoints worked so as 
not to give himself away while passing through one. He needed to know how to post a 
letter, how to get ration stamps, how to greet someone on the street. This information was 
usually prepared by Henry Sutton himself and the briefings were held in London at a 
place known as Milwaukee School.
116
  
The final briefing, however, was tailored to each individual mission and was 
handled specifically by Bach officers. Target information, a description of type of 
intelligence the agent was expected to gather, how he was to report it back to OSS, and 
what items of intelligence were viewed as most important by his handlers were all 
explained to the agent. He needed to be able to answer all questions about all documents 
he held. He needed to be prepared to explain how he got to where he was, his family 
history, his work history, to account for any scars on his body. An agent’s briefings 
would also include detailed information on the towns and cities that his cover claimed he 
had been to or lived in and a supply of miscellaneous items to make his cover more 
convincing in case he was searched. This included ticket stubs from cities he had 
supposedly visited recently, German cigarettes, local currency, and a variety of other 
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minutiae that could possibly make his cover story that much more convincing.
117
 Since 
the tiniest mistake could blow an entire cover, the process of briefing also involved the 
agent being subjected to a mock Gestapo interrogation, being awakened in the middle of 
the night by a case officer shouting “What is your name? Who is your mother? Where are 
you from?”
118
 
Obviously, a number of details had to be established in preparing an agent to 
utilize his cover. It is important to examine some of these details so as to understand what 
exactly Bach did and how accomplished its staff was at providing covers. First, Bach had 
to establish a field of employment for the agent, as “all men and women in Germany 
must work as directed by Arbeitsamter [the Nazi work and employment offices]. Agents 
must account for their not working at any particular moment or show that they have an 
essential job.”
119
 As a result, covers were dictated by the type of job an agent was 
supposed to hold. Some fields of employment worked better than others, and examples of 
successful cover jobs were truck drivers, members of the Abwehr (a German intelligence 
service), foreign workers, and railway workers.
 120
 Such fields of employment also 
allowed the OSS to infiltrate areas in which they had an interest. For example, the Labor 
Branch’s early goal was to establish a network of underground trade workers to resist 
Hitler and Nazism; fields like the railway and manufacturing in which foreign workers 
were employed would be ripe territory for possible recruitment to a resistance league.  
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Bach also paid close attention to family history, taking care to ensure that the 
agent’s cover story birthplace was “sufficiently far away from the area of operation” so as 
to minimize the number of checks that could be done into his history while on his 
mission. The farther away his birthplace, the more difficult it would be for the Gestapo or 
other police agency to search for his records and discover that there were none. A similar 
procedure was followed in creating the agent’s cover story parents. In most cover stories, 
the parents were listed as dead, either having died long before or during the war in an air 
raid. In both instances, the parents’ homes were located in towns or cities far from the 
agent’s area of operations. Close checks were also done to ensure that there were graves 
for the agent’s cover story parents in the town they were supposedly buried in, as well as 
verification that, if the story said they had died in an air raid, that an air raid had occurred 
in that town at the time of the death.121 Bach was getting better at the creation of cover 
stories with every mission they helped to dispatch. 
In short, Bach made significant efforts to improve the agent’s chance of survival 
if asked any questions, by any person, at any time. While Bach’s intent was to allow the 
agent to both achieve his mission aim and to survive, survival seemed to take precedence 
over obtaining specific intelligence. In all likelihood, the thinking was that a live agent 
who could not quite achieve his exact mission was still more valuable than a dead agent. 
As such, and despite the details mentioned above, Bach aimed to keep cover stories “as 
simple as possible… The story will be laid out in the areas with which the agent is 
personally familiar.”
122
 This maximized the agent’s ability to maintain his cover, as he 
would be able to truthfully answer certain questions and not have to search his memory 
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for answers to others. For example, if he was to infiltrate Berlin, it would be much easier 
for a native Berliner to move comfortably around the city rather than putting in someone 
who had never even been there. Likewise, if a man had been a steelworker while living in 
Germany before the war, it made sense to have him use that occupation as his cover. He 
could then converse easily about his job skills and raise fewer suspicions than if Bach had 
a farmer posing as a steelworker. The same held true for the documents that Bach put in 
the agent’s possession. Genuine documents were best, partially forged papers the next 
best, and least desirable of all were wholly fabricated ones. The same principle held here 
as with the cover stories; the closer to the real thing, the better.123   
Bach Section’s cover techniques began a tradition in U. S. intelligence that carried 
over into the CIA. The Directorate of Operations branch (DO), the component 
responsible for running foreign agents, takes a new DO agent’s credit cards, drivers 
license, bank cards—anything that has his name on it. These are then replaced with both 
everyday forms of identification, i.e. store membership cards, licenses, et cetera, and then 
supplemented with any special documentation his mission may require. Whether a 
passport, visa, or employment identification, the CIA, like the OSS Bach Section, has 
gained the uncanny ability of making one man disappear and replacing him with one who 
had never before existed.
124
 
Bach Section’s process of creating a cover story and finding documents and 
equipment that would support it was clearly complicated. Even though Bach strove to 
keep the stories as simple as possible, one can tell that any cover story would have been 
subjected to numerous cross-checks, document verifications, and clothing inspections. 
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Yet when a cover was as ready as possible, Bach staff and their superiors in OSS put their 
faith in their creation and sent the agents in to do their jobs.  
One series of Labor Branch missions handled by Bach section was known as the 
Tool series. Comprised of five separate missions using one or two men each, the Tool 
missions were intended primarily to contact members of the Free Germany National 
Committee still living in Germany in order to create underground resistance groups. They 
would also report any relevant military intelligence when available.
125
 Adolf Buchholz, 
the agent on the Mallet mission which was dropped on 1 April 1945 near Berlin, took on 
cover as a Gestapo official; his documents identified him as such and enabled him to 
move around the Berlin area with minimal suspicion. Bach gave the Buzzsaw mission’s 
agent, Walter Fischer, cover as a Schutzstaffel, or SS, member who was supposedly in 
Leipzig to trace a group of French foreign workers believed to be preparing sabotage 
against the German government.
126
 In actuality, he was there to gather labor, industrial, 
and military intelligence against the Nazis. Other covers provided for the Tool men 
included machinists, laborers, and other trade workers. The covers for the two men on the 
Hammer mission will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. The Hammer mission 
will also serve as the main subject of fictionalization in the historical novel portion of this 
work. 
Interestingly, Bach gave many very similar stories, even when the agents were 
going to be working together on the same mission. The Doctor mission, which was 
launched on 23 March 1945, provides one example. The covers for the two agents on the 
Doctor mission, Jan Denis and Jean Smets, followed their real lives, education and work 
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history exactly until a certain point. Both men’s covers used their birth names (Denis and 
Smets were names the men had each adopted while students; their given names were 
Alfonse Blontrock and Jan Blocks respectively). Denis’s cover was entirely true up until 
7 February 1944. Smet’s story was also completely true until September 1943, tracing his 
real career and education step by step. It is at this point that the agents’ stories stop 
following their real lives and their covers begin. Both men supposedly volunteered for 
labor in Germany; Denis in February 1944, Smets in September 1943. Both men’s 
documents showed that each was assigned (at different points in time) to work for the 
Optische Werke in Munich; Bach chose this plant because it has been partly destroyed by 
Allied bombing on 25 February 1944. Conveniently, with some of the factory destroyed, 
it would have been difficult for the Gestapo to check the company’s records to see if 
Denis and Smets had ever really worked there. Instead, both men also carried papers 
giving them leave from the Optische Werke to travel to the nearby town of Kufstein (just 
across the Austrian border but under German control) after the air raid, a practice not 
unusual after a factory became inoperable. Indeed, Kufstein was the area into which 
Denis and Smets parachuted in 1945.
127
 
Ironically, even though the men were using their own names, Bach forged all of 
their identity documents. They each carried a Belgian identity card (as their nationality 
was Belgian), the standard-issue foreigner’s passport, an employment card, a travel 
certificate for foreign workers, and ration cards. The fact that the Doctor mission was 
able to send back numerous wireless telegraph messages to the OSS, act as a reception 
committee for two further OSS teams, organize a resistance movement, coordinate supply 
drops, and gather valuable intelligence demonstrates just how effective their covers were. 
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Furthermore, both Denis and Smets were successfully recovered when the American 
army reached southern Germany and northern Austria. 
Another interesting cover story appeared in the Chauffeur mission, which entered 
Germany just eight days after Doctor had landed. Like the Doctor agents, the two men 
participating in Chauffeur were supposedly Belgian workers, though this time fleeing to 
Regensburg from Nuremberg, via Frankfurt, ahead of the Allied advance. One of the 
agents, however, took action to create a cover different from the usual one that Bach 
provided for their Belgian agents. Albert Lavare wanted to use a real name for his cover, 
but using his own was too risky. Instead, Lavare insisted that he be given the name of one 
of his friends, even though this man was known to be alive and living in Germany. He 
had a picture of this friend, and the two looked enough alike for Bach to agree with the 
idea. Bach also thought it might be helpful that, if the Germans did check up on his 
identity, they would at least find a real name in the records. Thus, Bach and Lavare 
worked together to craft a complete history for Lavare’s friend, in whose name Lavare 
would travel and work.  
Lavare’s partner in the Chauffeur mission, Andre Renaix, had a more traditional 
Bach-established story. Posing as a Belgian railway worker, his cover stated he had 
simply gone to work in Nuremberg until he decided to leave with Lavare. Like the 
Belgians on the Doctor mission, the Chauffeur agents each received a Belgian identity 
card, a work card, foreign worker’s passport, and also factory passes to the plant they had 
both supposedly worked at in Nuremberg. Also like the Doctor mission, the Chauffeur 
mission was a success. The two men used the Joan/Eleanor radio communication system, 
and were able to make two contacts with the OSS. They successfully observed military 
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traffic, and were recovered safely, their false identities having held up satisfactorily in the 
Reich. 
The cover stories that Bach provided varied by the agent’s history, his intended 
target, and a number of other factors. What is important to note is how excellent the 
covers, and especially the documents, were. According to William Casey, head of the 
Secret Intelligence branch, only two sets of documents, of the hundreds of documents 
produced by Bach, failed to pass German inspection. “On two occasions German military 
officials issued orders warning that American agents in southern Germany were equipped 
with papers that could not be detected as false.”
128
 The 85
th
 Army Corps (German) stated 
in their 12 March 1945 Order of the Day that “The enemy forges identity papers so 
perfectly that only trained experts of the Security Police can recognize the 
falsification.”
129
 Perhaps the highest compliment to the Bach associates’ abilities to 
produce falsified documents came upon the recovery of one of their agents, who was 
unable to convince the American officer to whom he had been taken that he was an OSS 
agent. When he claimed that his documents were all forged and produced them for 
inspection, a German POW with expert knowledge of authentic German documents, 
testified that the documents were genuine!
130
 Once more, the quality of Bach’s work was 
proven in practice. Bach had nearly perfected the art of documentation, a tradition that, as 
will be shown, continued and expanded in the era of the CIA. 
The agents themselves also had high praise for the covers provided by Bach. 
When they were in the Reich, agents could expect identity checks ranging from 
                                                 
128 Memo, Final Report on SI Operations into Germany, from Chief, SI, ETO to CO, OSS, ETO, 
24 July 1945. As found in Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler, 293. 
129 The Overseas Target, 308. 
130 Ibid. 
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superficial spot checks by local police and civil defense groups, to intense interrogations 
by the Gestapo, SS, SD, and other government and Nazi party agencies. The Chauffeur 
team was confronted by two Volkssturm men (a civil defense agency), the mayor of 
Kufstein, the police in a town called Abensberg, a group of military police, and the SS. 
Each time they passed the confrontation easily and without trouble. One of the Chauffeur 
agents recorded in his debriefing report: “I cannot say too much in praise of the 
thoroughness with which this mission has been prepared—a fact which has helped us 
greatly in our work. The documents given to us were particularly well prepared; they 
were checked several times without any hazards to us.”
131
 Similarly, the Hammer team 
reported upon its return to England that their papers were perfect, as did a number of 
other teams after their recoveries. 
Unfortunately, the agents’ papers and covers were not perfect all the time. One 
agent whose cover and documentation did not hold up was part of the Martini mission 
dispatched to Augsburg on 18 March 1945. The agent, known as Adrian, encountered the 
Kripo (Criminal Police) while seeking work on the railroad. The Kripo demanded to see 
Adrian’s traveling orders, which Bach had unfortunately failed to provide him with. 
Adrian claimed to have lost his travel orders. This began a chain of events which 
involved Adrian paying off a railroad official in order to get himself out of the situation. 
Believing that he was out of danger, he then continued on his way to report to another 
office to begin work. When he arrived there, they ordered him to report to another office 
to have some of his papers renewed. Upon arriving at an office to have his soldier’s book 
updated, the official noticed that his physical description had not been entered in the 
book. The official also noticed that his citizenship status would have made it impossible 
                                                 
131 OSS/London War Diary, reel 8, vol. 12, 113. 
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for him to be a railroad official as he claimed; suspicions were raised even further when 
the official realized Adrian was single, childless, and had never served in the military. 
This was practically impossible at this time in Germany. The official called in the police, 
who recognized his name from a bulletin the Kripo had sent out earlier putting police 
officers on alert to watch for unusual behavior from Adrian, as his papers did not appear 
to be in order. The police took him into custody and soon turned him over to the Gestapo, 
who beat and severely tortured him for five days. On the sixth day, he was to be shot as a 
spy. Fortunately, that morning an American air raid was unleashed over the prison where 
he was held, and Adrian managed to escape and flee into a nearby forest. He took shelter 
with some Russian and Polish slave workers, who sympathized when he told them he had 
been beaten by the Gestapo for being a deserter (he could not tell them he was a spy, 
obviously). Eventually, the U. S. army entered the forest where Adrian was hiding and 
recovered him. Despite his extremely weakened physical condition, he stayed on with the 
army in order to help them recognize and capture Gestapo officials. Among those 
officials captured were the two who had tortured him for five days; he executed both of 
them.
132
  
Adrian’s story demonstrates how terribly wrong things could go if an agent’s 
papers and documents did not hold up. To Adrian’s credit, he never cracked under the 
physical and psychological trauma of torture, and did not reveal that he was a spy or that 
he had a partner working nearby. While he was lucky to escape with his life, a few other 
agents went missing in Germany, never to return. Whether they were discovered to be 
spies by the Germans, mistaken by the Red Army as the enemy, or simply caught in 
                                                 
132 SI War Diary, vol. 12, Book 3, 301-305, History Files, as appears in the Overseas Target, 312-
313. 
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bombing raids may never be known. But the fact remains that the vast majority of agents 
who infiltrated Germany carried out their missions and returned alive, having lived their 
cover stories successfully.  
More important than the intricately contrived cover stories themselves is, of 
course, what the cover stories that Bach provided enabled. From the passing of 
intelligence to Allied bomber squadrons to the creation of small resistance forces, the 
cover stories Bach provided for the men and women entering Germany became 
critical.
133
 One must remember that the German Reich was one of the most tightly 
controlled, document-heavy police states ever created. Records on the ancestry of most 
Germans went back four and five generations, and the Gestapo was known to search 
these records. Captured German soldiers were known to carry up to 30 different 
documents.
 134
 Furthermore, Germany had become a state of informants, with neighbors 
reporting the slightest misdeeds of neighbors and children turning in their mothers and 
fathers to the police for a careless word of criticism. Even when the Reich began its final 
collapse and some government controls faltered, Nazi Germany remained a place of 
intimidating police and random searches. Without the covers and training provided by 
Bach, an OSS agent could not be expected to stay alive in Germany, let alone gather 
intelligence and circulate it back to his handlers.  
Bach, assisted by the flexibility and talents of the Labor Branch, was an 
exemplary intelligence system, one whose legacy lived on after the dissolution of the 
OSS on October 1, 1945. Recall that William Casey, who served as both OSS London 
secretariat and CIA director, remarked after the war that “the labor desk people were the 
                                                 
133 For a detailed discussion of what the missions that Bach assisted on accomplished, see chapters 
1 and 3. 
134 OSS/London War Diary, Reel 8, vol. 12, book 2, 142. 
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only people who had any preparation for working into Germany. We had to turn to them 
to get information about the controls, the rationing, how the hell to stay alive.”
135
 This 
quotation makes a few points clear. First, the Labor Branch was a group who had 
provided absolutely essential intelligence about Germany, intelligence that kept agents 
safe, allowed them to complete their missions, and proved that the difficulties of 
infiltrating an enemy police state could be overcome. The material provided in this 
chapter makes clear that the Bach Section played an enormous role in this process.  
Yet the Bach Section, within its context of the Labor Branch, had a longer-
reaching impact. Bach and the Labor Branch’s ability to infiltrate Germany were a key 
factor in shaping the future of foreign intelligence in the United States. Not surprisingly, 
Casey himself was influential in the circles that established the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and served as director from 1981 until 1987. The CIA, having people like Casey, 
Allen Dulles, and other former OSS officers on its staff, grew into an organization that 
actively participated in subversive infiltration and warfare, especially during the Cold 
War. This tendency stemmed from the OSS’ success in penetrating a number of countries 
in World War II.
136
 Arguably, their success in Germany gave them the most confidence 
to continue on with infiltrations, making contact with underground resistance groups, and 
subverting foreign governments.   
The CIA, while not a replica of the OSS, followed the example set by Bach and 
Labor Branch in another way as well. Unlike most intelligence services, which separate 
intelligence-gathering from covert operations, the CIA took on the model of the Labor 
Branch and handled both. As shown earlier in this chapter and in chapter 1, the Labor 
                                                 
135 William Casey, interview by Joseph Persico, August 27, 1976, transcript, Folder Casey, Box 1, 
Persico Papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford, CA,  9-10. 
136 MacPherson, American Intelligence in Wartime London, 181. 
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Branch refused to be an intelligence-gathering branch only. They strove and succeeded in 
using that information, with the assistance of Bach, to plan and execute infiltrations into 
Germany. Casey and others had seen firsthand the value of using intelligence-gathering 
and mission execution together, and the CIA hence took on this style as well.
137
 In the 
1960s, however, the CIA started to stray from using this coordinated method. As a result, 
the intelligence they gathered and missions they sent out were of poor quality, resulting 
in calls to return to the system that had first been gleaned from Bach and Labor Sections 
experiences:  
At the heart of this problem, as far as the CIA effort is concerned, lies the 
fact that the Agency is a house divided between intelligence collection 
[through covert operations] and intelligence research. Mr. Kent noted a 
decade ago that the segregation of covert collection activities was dictated 
by the need for secrecy….In today’s highest-priority intelligence 
problems, I suggest, the segregation of intelligence collection from 
research is a luxury we no longer can afford.
138
 
 
Thus, while the CIA varied how closely intelligence gathering versus intelligence 
research was related, when troubles arose during the Cold War calls were made to return 
to what had worked in World War II, and the system established by Bach Section and the 
Labor Branch.  
 Bach’s legacy of cover and documentation methods and success was also carried 
over to the CIA. In 1979, six employees of the U. S. State Department found themselves 
trapped in Iran during the hostage situation at the United States embassy in Tehran. The 
six had not been at the embassy at the time of the takeover, and had thus avoided capture. 
However, the threat against them remained, and their exfiltration to the U. S. was critical. 
                                                 
137 Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler, 219. 
138 Walter E. Seidel, “Great Frusina Revisited: The Problem of Priority-Positive Intelligence,” in 
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The CIA undertook this task in a mission called “Argos,” after both an inside joke shared 
by members of the team that ran the mission and also after the ship of Greek mythology. 
The procedure of creating the covers and creating identities contained remarkable 
similarities to Bach Section projects. Ephemera such as matchbooks and movie stubs 
were collected to be used by the six being smuggled out of Iran as “pocket litter,” 
evocative of the same materials OSS agents were provided with. The CIA forged 
passports for the six, arranged visas, false identities, and disguises. The chosen covers: 
members of a Canadian movie crew scouting a location for a feature film. Cover names 
were carefully chosen, and in Tehran, the six were asked to choose which cover they 
were most comfortable with, evoking Bach practices of involving agents in creating and 
personalizing covers that would be most comfortable to them. Indeed, throughout the 
article describing the Argos mission, there are many similarities to the way Bach had 
arranged missions thirty-five years before. Indeed the greatest similarity was the 
mission’s success. All six State Department employees and the CIA agents who had gone 
in to free them escaped Iran safely and were returned to the U. S. While in this case the 
aim was exfiltration instead of infiltration, the ways and means of moving individuals 
from a hostile territory demonstrates the lasting legacy Bach’s practices had on the 
CIA.
139
 
Simply put, the Bach Section, facilitated through the Labor Branch, became the 
essential agency enabling infiltration of Nazi Germany’s police state. Of the 102 SI 
missions and nearly 200 agents infiltrated into Germany between 1 September 1944 and 
the end of the war in Europe, the Bach section completed work on cover and briefing for 
                                                 
139 The Argos mission is detailed in Antonio J. Mendez, “CIA Goes Hollywood,” Studies in 
Intelligence, Winter 1999/2000, 1-16. 
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72 missions involving 145 agents. March and April 1945 were certainly their busiest 
period. On March 18, 1945 only four teams had been infiltrated into the Reich. After that 
date the number jumped dramatically, with up to four teams per day being sent in.
140
 In 
this collective clandestine group, the loss rate of agents came in under 5 percent. Some of 
these agents were killed in plane crashes en route to their destinations, while others fell 
victim to friendly fire. Extraordinarily few agents had their covers blown. Their 
documents did not give them away, nor did their clothing. The stories they told as their 
life histories held up, often without question. Bach enabled, in one year, what older and 
more established intelligence agencies deemed impossible: the covert penetration of Nazi 
Germany. Their coordination with the Labor Branch, their joint accomplishment of 
German infiltration, and their remarkable talents at creating cover stories, obtaining 
intelligence, and forging documents would establish a tradition in U. S. intelligence that 
would carry over into the CIA.
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Chapter Three 
 
The OSS in Fiction: What has been Done and How to do it Better 
 
The previous two chapters have demonstrated both the bureaucracy and the drama 
that coexisted in the Labor Branch of the OSS. With true stories of espionage, cover 
stories, disguises, the constant potential for arrest and torture, the Labor Branch is 
naturally suited to be a topic for novelists and historians alike. People enjoy reading 
adventure stories, whether based in fact or entirely fictional. While the bureaucratic side 
of things might not be as captivating, it too reveals some of the more complicated 
nuances of secret intelligence and reiterates just how advanced American espionage 
became in a few short months. However, it can be difficult to balance these two sides of 
the OSS: how does one incorporate the day-to-day administrative activities that were 
crucial to the success of the OSS with the limited but enthralling episodes of infiltration? 
One such way is through crafting a work of historical fiction. Doing so enables an author 
to interweave all sides of the OSS Labor Branch history with dialogue, a plot including 
an exposition, rising action, climax, falling action, and denouement, descriptions of 
historical scenes and events, and characters and conflicts that a reader can relate to. 
Within this framework, the less interesting parts of OSS history can be less obtrusively 
included and used to support the dramatic events.  
 The OSS Labor Branch as a topic of historical fiction also has the potential to 
reach a larger audience than it would if handled conventionally. The American public 
reads a significant amount of historical fiction every year.
141
 As a result, Americans 
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receive some of their understanding of history from historical novels, and schoolteachers 
often use historical fiction in the classroom.
142
 This presents some challenges, especially 
when one considers that many historical novels are written without thorough research by 
a professional historian. As a result, some historical novels fall victim to historical clichés 
and anachronisms, which in turn leave readers confused and misinformed. These 
challenges require action and solution by authors of historical fiction. If an author is to 
use real historical events as a form of entertainment, she must do so with a responsibility 
to both the past and her readers. The author must recognize that her handling of history is 
influential and that readers can mistake historical fiction as fact.  
There are many works of historical fiction that take the OSS as a main topic and 
include some measures of historical accuracy. In Shining Through, by Susan Isaacs, a 31-
year-old American woman named Linda Voss ends up spying for the OSS in Berlin, 
employed as a cook by a high-ranking member of the Abwehr. Isaacs details Voss’s time 
at the OSS Assessment School and at Training School, with both descriptions matching 
reasonably well with historical accounts and official OSS records of both places. Isaacs 
mentions the type of cover documents that Voss has as well: her passport, Arbeitsbuch, 
and ration card. These historical details are reassuring to the historian who is familiar 
with OSS history. However, Isaacs provides the average reader with no means of 
knowing whether the descriptions and events in the book are very factually accurate, 
somewhat accurate, or entirely invented. A note at the beginning of the book merely 
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states that, “Apart from obvious historical references to public figures and events, the 
characters and incidents in this novel are fictional.”
143
  
Unfortunately, it can be difficult for a non-historian of the OSS to know what the 
“obvious historical references” are. Is it an obvious historical reference, for example, 
when the main character sneaks into Berlin in 1942? Hopefully not, as the OSS did not 
have any agents infiltrated into any part of Germany at that time. Is it an obvious 
historical reference when the character describes her training experiences? What about 
the scenes in Berlin, the way the rationing system functioned, or the types of documents 
from which the character was able to glean intelligence? There is such a large overlap 
and so few means in this novel to distinguish historical accuracy from what Isaacs is 
assuming about what happened. As a result, the reader takes away little more than a 
mental image of how the OSS might, or might not, have operated.  
Also problematic is the way in which the historical details are included in Shining 
Through, that is, they tend to be outside the lines of the rest of the general dialogue and 
flow. Isaacs has difficulty weaving the facts into the narrative and it is when the reader 
notes this abrupt change in pacing that she suspects she has stumbled on a bit of history 
rather than continued with the story. It feels like the historical details are being related by 
a voice other than the main character, who is also the narrator. For example, when 
remembering an event at the Training school, Linda Voss relates, “But on other 
nights…like after the Scare House, where I’d been sent up a dark flight of stairs with my 
pistol and heard footsteps behind me, and threatening German voices off so low I 
couldn’t make out where they were or what they were saying….”
144
 This description, 
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while accurate of an OSS exercise, within the context of the rest of the novel feels like it 
has been dropped in for effect. The character’s voice gets lost, and it feels like Isaacs 
came across this interesting tidbit about OSS training, thought “I could use this!,” and 
inserted it into the text. This type of issue could be solved if the author had a greater 
historical understanding of the OSS. Being familiar with the facts of how an agent was 
recruited, trained, and infiltrated will make creating a story encompassing those elements 
much easier. If Isaacs were to know the history about this training exercise, her 
description of it would not come off as flatly as it does.  
Granted, it is likely that Isaacs did not intend to educate her audience, but 
primarily to entertain them with an exciting adventure and love story. This she 
accomplishes. However, I still believe that a historian handling historical fiction can both 
educate and entertain effectively. The OSS has a huge number of exciting stories that do 
not have to be forced into the framework of a historical monograph. The things that a 
historian cannot always know, such as what the agents did while they were waiting for 
their documents to be processed; how they felt; what their rooms looked like; what they 
said to each other: these things are not always part of the historical record but can be 
created and inferred to connect the things that were known to have happened in a 
narrative. As mentioned in the introduction, Simon Schama does this well in Dead 
Certainties (Unwarranted Speculations). Natalie Zemon Davis in The Return of Martin 
Guerre readily admits that her telling of this famous French case of stolen identity is “in 
part my invention, but held tightly in check by the voices of the past.”
145
 Carlo Ginzburg 
is another master at bringing historical truth and conjecture together into a narrative. 
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Doing as these historians do, but for an even wider audience, using a topic of greater 
general public interest, and taking more liberties with plot construction is my end goal. 
As mentioned above, Susan Isaacs includes some historical facts, but they are 
difficult to distinguish within the book. This may be partially attributable to the fact that 
Isaacs is not a military or intelligence “buff,” and thus she lacks some of the background 
knowledge to enable her historical interludes to flow more freely within the narrative. W. 
E. B. Griffin, on the other hand, has written more fiction about the OSS than any other 
author. His Men At War series currently comprises five books following OSS agents in 
World War II. His Honor Bound series, consisting of three books, details OSS operations 
in Argentina.
146
 Griffin employs a few methods of combining history with fiction, and his 
works demonstrate a clear understanding of some of the nuances of the OSS. He is 
especially adept at interweaving the bureaucratic intricacies of the organization into the 
narrative, having his characters continually battle through and overcome the challenges 
and stresses that were part of the day-to-day reality of working for the OSS. For example, 
in The Soldier Spies, a scene between head of the OSS William Donovan, OSS-London 
chief David Bruce, and a fictional character reveals the internal debates over who should 
know what details about a specific mission, and when.
147
 The dialogue reflects the same 
type of debates that were held in real OSS memos and reports and captures the ambience 
of the bureaucracy.  
   However, Griffin does struggle, like Isaacs, to underscore what is fact and what 
is fiction. One source of this confusion is the appearance of many real individuals in his 
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novels, such as Donovan, Bruce, and a number of high-ranking German government, 
army, and intelligence officers. While including these individuals puts the reader in direct 
contact with history, it also raises the issue of delineating what actually happened from 
the author’s own creations. While he begins many of his works with a prologue setting up 
some historical context, Griffin could more fully solve this problem by including some 
type of notes. Interestingly, in The Soldier Spies one footnote appears, explaining a 
reference to a battle between Russian and Hungarian forces in 1943.
148
 The reader now 
quickly gains an understanding and an education about something he or she might 
otherwise have completely overlooked. Unfortunately, there are no other footnotes in that 
book or the others in the series. I found the appearance of real historical figures with little 
historical context to be confusing, and feel that Griffin’s works would be better served 
were he to include some system of explaining who each person actually was.  
Another method that Griffin could improve upon is his inclusion of made-up 
telegrams, memos, and OSS documents. He uses this device at least thirty times in The 
Fighting Agents, and relies on it numerous times in his other works as well. While the 
documents are interesting, move the plot forward, and grab the reader’s eye (they are set 
in a different font and placed in gray text boxes), they do not carry the weight or impact 
of seeing a real OSS document, with its “Top Secret” stamp across the top and the initials 
of the recipient or sender at the end.
149
 Furthermore, the use of actual OSS documents 
would expose the reader to primary source material, something one does not normally 
encounter when reading for pleasure. However, primary documents are the most 
enjoyable part of historical research. They are what bring the past to life and relay a 
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person’s voice and inflection. Griffin would be better off if he selected and edited 
authentic OSS documents that would fit his plot and incorporate those into his novels, 
and made note of this technique in a prologue or afterword. 
Another work of fiction involving the OSS that has both positive and negative 
elements is Nelson De Mille’s The Talbot Odyssey. While this novel is more concerned 
with the CIA during the Cold War, De Mille uses the history of the OSS to set up his 
story line. He does so quite capably, weaving the functions and accomplishments of the 
OSS into his narrative, giving his characters personal and family connections to the OSS, 
and exploring how the OSS was the forebear of the CIA. His acknowledgments recognize 
“Joseph Persico for sharing with me his knowledge of the Office of Strategic 
Services.…” Persico is one of the foremost OSS scholars, and knowing that De Mille 
consulted with Persico is evidence that he undertook some degree of historical research 
with a highly reliable source. However, in a section titled “Regarding Persons and 
Places,” De Mille also points out that “The Veterans of the Office of Strategic Services 
have in no way helped with or endorsed this novel,” thereby leaving a potentially 
valuable source unutilized.
150
 His best option, of course, would have been to work with 
both Persico and OSS veterans, combining their input and thereby improving his 
understand of OSS history even further. Had De Mille conducted a more complete 
historiographical study of the OSS, his understanding and incorporation of the facts could 
have been even better integrated into the novel. 
Having examined the novels mentioned above, it becomes clear that there are a 
few ways that authors of historical fiction can minimize reader misinformation. First and 
foremost, good historical research should be conducted before beginning any work of 
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historical fiction. Relying solely on one’s own understanding of a historical era or event 
leads to misinterpretation by the author. Instead, one should have at the least a basic 
understanding of the historiography of the topic. Knowing what scholars and historians 
have argued about and researched in the past gives the author of historical fiction a 
balanced idea of the event or historical character and allows her to utilize that knowledge 
within the novel. 
Doing a case study is another way that an author of historical fiction can help 
ensure that her work is both accurate and entertaining. Having first established the 
historiography of the topic, a responsible author should then be able to choose one among 
a variety of events or individuals who appeared in the historical context. This singular 
event, while unique in some ways, should still relate closely to the accepted history of the 
topic. The chosen individual or event should also provide the author with inspiration for 
the fictional aspect of the novel. The case study should be investigated with as much 
thoroughness and detail as was devoted to the historiography. Accuracy and the fullest 
possible understanding are once again vital, for the event will serve as the author’s 
“illustrated reference.” That is to say, a familiarity with the specific event should 
illuminate in the author’s mind an image that she wishes to convey to her readers in the 
novel. Through a case study, she should begin to develop a picture in her mind’s eye of 
her characters, their traits, what influences them and their decisions, how they speak, 
where they live, and what they think, feel, and see. Only a close relationship with the 
past, which is most thoroughly obtained through a case study, will enable an author of 
historical fiction to illuminate for her audience the full, broad spectrum of everyday life 
in the past. A case study will allow the author to suggest, not affirm, what happened in 
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the past. This ability to suggest, rather than lecture, is crucial to successful fictional 
writing. 
The author also has the responsibility to delineate for her readers what is fact and 
fiction within the novel. Including notes at the end of a historical novel provides a reader 
with unobtrusive guidance about the history that appears in the book. The notes might be 
organized not by including numbers within the text, but simply by beginning the note at 
the end with the first part of the sentence within the text to which the note relates. Notes 
might inform a reader when a statement is true or has been fictionalized, provide brief 
contextualization about historical events where appropriate, and give source citations for 
the historical references made in the text. Doing so can help minimize confusion by a 
reader about historical events versus fictionalized ones. For example, if one is reading a 
historical novel set during the Civil War and the actual historic events at one plantation 
are used as inspiration for specific fictional events in the novel, inserting a note at the end 
of these sections can be very valuable. The note would allow the author to talk briefly 
about the real events that inspired the fiction, to acknowledge that these particular events 
in her book did not take place but are relevant because similar events actually did, and 
also to give the reader a scholarly source to consult for the full historical discussion. 
Proceeding in this manner can significantly reduce confusion by the reader and also raise 
the standard of historical fiction in just a few words. 
One effective way of using notes within a work of historical fiction is to first 
point out their inclusion in a brief preface or introduction and explain the purpose of the 
notes. Alerting the reader that the author has provided further information and 
explanations about what appears in the text gives the reader the knowledge that what he 
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or she is about to read is only based partially on historical research and fact. The notes 
themselves will direct the interested reader to available sources, or clear up confusion or 
disagreements between the fictional text and the known historiography of the event or 
time period in question. Notes are one of the most direct ways of communicating history 
within historical fiction, and failure to include those notes is irresponsible on the part of 
the author. 
Including primary source documents efficiently and dramatically within works of 
historical fiction is another highly effective way of teaching readers about the past. Not 
only do primary documents substantiate statements occurring within the text, they often 
get readers excited about the past. There is something very visceral and personal about 
being able to see firsthand what someone from the past has written, what they looked 
like, or, in the case of the OSS, how the documents they carried as part of their cover 
stories appeared. Another example would be including an old map within the text of a 
historical novel. A reader with an interest in geography or travel might find this a far 
more effective learning tool than simply being told in words where a character was based. 
Primary documents can serve to validate history within historical fiction and also 
encourage and excite readers about how history is studied. There is no reason to exclude 
such valuable sources within historical fiction. 
Obviously, taking the steps suggested above means that the author of historical 
fiction would have to do a fair amount of research before even beginning the novel. One 
might then ask herself, why even bother? What is the objective of doing fiction in such a 
way? Certainly there are plenty of histories already written—why not direct readers to 
those? For this author, the answer is clear. Historical fiction, since it is consumed so 
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rapidly and readily by the public, is an excellent outlet for public history; that is, 
conducting historical research with the intent that the end product is designed for a lay 
audience. Public history plays an enormous role in teaching children and adults alike 
about the past, be it in a museum, a documentary film, or a historical novel. Yet the 
difference between a museum or documentary and a historical novel is that the first two 
have already integrated a level of historical and scholarly research needed to make them 
educational. I would contend that historical novels, as a genre, are not yet to that level on 
a consistent basis. That is not to say, however, that historical fiction cannot equal the 
level of teaching value of museums and documentaries, because it very readily can. 
Writing a novel based on scholarly research is one way. Encouraging authors of historical 
fiction who do not have backgrounds in history to use primary sources, to investigate a 
topic’s historiography, to use their talent to teach and entertain, is another. Doing so 
requires making these authors, and their readers, aware of public history’s potential, and 
to use that potential to raise the standard of historical information in the historical novel.  
 Historical novels also have inherent qualities that make them useful public history 
tools. First and foremost, historical novels have the ability to make the past come alive. 
The author can focus on a singular event, and describe it in vivid detail without having to 
worry about explaining the overall significance of it. For some, history is a boring 
recitation of names and dates. All too often, history teachers leave out the role of the 
individual in history, the context in which humans experienced the past, an understanding 
of the different sights, smells, and sounds that would have been prevalent. While these 
details may be discussed in historical monographs, scholars tend to use a jargon intended 
for other scholars and not the general public. Historical fiction is therefore less 
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intimidating for the average reader and far more accessible. It provides the author with an 
outlet for including adjectives, creating dialog between historical characters, both real 
and fictional, and making even the driest history livelier. The fictional aspect gives the 
author creative license to slightly change facts, to tell a story from the past from multiple 
perspectives, and to do so in a way that will both educate and entertain readers. This style 
of bias is more acceptable in historical fiction than it will ever be in the historical 
monograph. Again, as long as the author includes notes and bases her story in historical 
research and an understanding of her subject, then she has enabled herself to embark 
upon the path of historical fiction.  
 With all of the above having been said, what follows is an attempt by this author 
to conduct a historical case study and place it within the context of the greater 
historiography and research that has appeared in chapters one and two of this work. The 
case study details some aspects of the OSS’s Hammer mission to Berlin in March 1945. 
The study is intended to lay the groundwork for a historical novel about the OSS 
infiltration of Nazi Germany. It includes a running commentary of how the case study 
can be used to create the novel.  
 
 
On March 28, 1945, from a field in Berlin, the following conversation between 
two OSS agents and an OSS crew circling overhead in an airplane took place: 
“Hello Heinz, here is Vic…” 
 
“Hello Vic, here is Heinz. I did not understand well. Can you repeat, please. 
Over…” 
 
“Hello Heinz, I am receiving your news, go ahead.” 
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“Klingenburg power plant on Rummelsburg Lake is fully functioning and is 
furnishing electric power to vital industries…. The following plants are located in 
one area on a branch canal, North bank of Teltow Canal, between Teltow and 
Licherfelds…Zeiss-Ikon, periscopes and instruments for tanks; Telefunken, 
nautical instruments…gyroscopes, contacts and instruments….We need 
groceries…. We need coffee, cigarettes, candles, knitting wool, salt, butter, fat, 
powdered egg, chocolate, powdered milk, Vaseline, cod liver oil, soap…. We 
need medicine that soldiers can take in order to become ill. We need four pistols 
and three knives; also food stamps and blanks or paper on which papers can be 
forged; likewise certificates of public employment offices from Berlin and outside 
Berlin….And rubber stamps to make new papers, and ration cards of every 
kind….[I] want to tell you to speed up as much as possible the supplies we 
ordered. Our landing field number one is to be used for dropping…. [Also,] the 
City Railroad is the only system of transportation in working order. The Ostkreuz 
junction is functioning again. If you interfere with the City Railroad, all traffic 
will be stopped….The City and Ring Railroad is the only working transportation 
in Berlin….The block of Kalitzer Street, Southeast, between Zaughof and 
Wrangel Streets, North Side, is the main post and telegraph office….Warschauer 
Street Freight Terminal, 700 meters from bridge, four sides. Main freight yards. 
On the 10
th
 and 18
th
 of March, respectively, there were 26 and 25 freight trains, 18 
and 10 passenger trains...4 locomotives.” 
 
“I understand. Have you anything more to say?” 
 
“Hello Heinz, this is Vic. Thank you very much. Best wishes from us. Good 
night, we shall hear you again. Over.” 
  
“Hello Vic, good night. Come again soon.”
151
 
 
Such was the communication between the OSS and two of their agents in 
Germany in late March 1945. In this particular instance, Heinz was the OSS spy team of 
Paul Lindner and Anton Ruh, sent into Berlin on March 1, 1945, and formally known as 
the Hammer team. The aim of their mission was similar to other missions sent by the 
Labor Branch into Germany: gather intelligence about local industry, production, military 
situations, and morale; set up resistance networks to harm these sectors; and report back 
to the OSS on their progress or lack thereof. This brief exchange between the men on the 
ground and their OSS colleagues thousands of feet above them in the air gives insight 
                                                 
151 Excerpt, Operations Report, DIP, SI/ETO, May 26, 1945, RG 226, E 110, Box 49, NA. 
  
 
88 
into what the agents, who had been on the ground for less than a month, saw and 
accomplished. Like other missions into Germany, the impact of the Hammer team on the 
outcome of the war is debatable; they did not hasten the end of the war, they could not 
locate Hitler’s secret bunker, and the intelligence they provided did not play a significant 
role in the collapse of Berlin. However, they did demonstrate that Berlin could be 
breached, that the capital of Nazi Germany was vulnerable, and that state controls were 
collapsing. Most impressively, they survived to tell their stories. Thus, while their 
individual impact may not have been great, the Hammer mission, among others, stands as 
an excellent representation of the capabilities of the OSS. 
However, the Hammer mission should not be seen as just another interesting OSS 
mission. It is also a valuable case study for me, as I attempt to write an historical novel 
about agents who penetrated Germany. Yet instead of rehashing the entire Hammer 
mission moment by moment, I will focus on specific elements within the mission, like the 
communication transcribed above, that best provide material for transforming this 
information into a historical novel.
152
 This will mean comparing these details with other 
missions, with earlier chapters in this work, and with my thoughts on how such elements 
can be used in a historical novel. Doing so will demonstrate that historical fiction can be 
done responsibly and lay the groundwork for a novel based in the real history of a time 
and place. While the novel itself is not part of this thesis, the following pages provide an 
outline of methods, events, and general chronology that I will follow when I do begin the 
novel.     
                                                 
152 For more information and chronological narratives about the Hammer mission, including 
details that might not appear in this chapter, see Persico, Piercing the Reich, and the SI/OSS London War 
Diary. 
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The Hammer mission is especially helpful to one writing an historical novel about 
the OSS because the records on the mission are extensive. From the OSS’s very first 
interviews and analyses of Lindner and Ruh to their postwar reports and debriefings, the 
OSS files on these two men reveal firsthand who they were and what they did as relates 
to their infiltration. However, before Hammer can be discussed in detail, one first needs 
place it within the greater intelligence effort from which it stemmed. Documents show 
that the planning for the Hammer mission began in 1944 as part of a larger infiltration 
plan. In August of that year, Secret Intelligence (SI) requested authorization from the 
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) to train and infiltrate 
thirty secret agents into Germany. This plan, known as Faust, was to collect military 
information and transmit it back to OSS and SHAEF. To do so, SI recognized that 
building relationships with underground, anti-Nazi networks would be vital to a 
successful infiltration.
153
 
 As explained in earlier chapters, by 1944 SI had finally realized that some 
underground labor groups in Germany were ardently anti-Nazi and well-positioned to aid 
OSS agents in surviving in Germany. Thus it was logical that SI would now turn directly 
to the Labor Branch for assistance. In SI’s original proposal for Faust, George Pratt stated 
that “The SI Branch of OSS has already recruited agents—men and women—thoroughly 
qualified and trained to carry out the Faust plan.”
154
 These men and women were the 
agents being handled by the Labor Branch, and would be among the first and most often 
infiltrated. Pratt also revealed that “…the SI Branch has a group of experts currently 
engaged in the collection and marshalling of available information on German controls, 
                                                 
153 Memorandum, George Pratt to John Haskell, “Plan for the Penetration of Germany for 
Intelligence Purposes,” August 15, 1944, RG 226, NA.   
154 Ibid. 
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regulations, documents, clothes and everyday life in general, necessary for the training 
and briefing of agents.”
155
 Here he was referring to the Bach section and revealing its 
capabilities and importance to his superiors in an attempt to finally get the infiltration of 
Germany underway.  
The ongoing resistance of the Germans and the inability of the Allies to extract an 
early unconditional surrender from Hitler meant that the high ranks of OSS and SHAEF 
were finally willing to consider the secret infiltration of Germany. On August 19, 1944, 
four days after Pratt’s memo was sent, SHAEF approved the plan, and the Labor Branch 
finally received the support it needed to do what they had been discussing and preparing 
for well over a year: send in its spies.
156
 The very first mission, called Downend and 
deployed on September 1, 1944, is discussed in chapter one of this work. Downend’s 
success, while hampered by the limited communication the agent had with OSS, 
nonetheless demonstrated that infiltration was possible. With this, recruitment, training, 
and execution of OSS missions to Germany swung into greater action. 
The Hammer mission fell under the aegis of the Faust plan. The official proposal 
from the mission was sent on November 6, 1944 from Thomas Wilson, Acting Chief of 
the Labor Division, to the then-chief of SI, Lieutenant Colonel Alan Scaife. In the 
proposal, Wilson called for three specific objectives, in addition to those laid down for all 
Faust missions. The agents were “to establish and maintain contact with the Free 
Germany Committee group in Berlin...to secure and transmit intelligence obtained 
through such contacts as prior and continuing directives of the military authorities will 
                                                 
155 Ibid. 
156 See chapter one, page 35, for the details on this approval. 
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require…[and] to arrange for the reception of additional agents.”
157
 Obviously, this 
would be a risky mission. Not only was the Labor Branch staff preparing to enter 
Germany, they were aiming for the capital itself. The Labor Branch would expect the 
agents to make contact with illegal underground groups who had been long persecuted 
and had lost countless members to the Gestapo, prisons, and concentration camps. 
Amazingly, the Branch had two agents willing and able to take on these challenges. 
Before discussing these agents, on whom my two main characters in the novel 
will be loosely based, I will note that this lead-up to the Hammer mission will be a 
necessary part of the novel. Setting up the bureaucracy of the OSS and providing the 
reader with some context about how the idea for the mission developed will be vital. This 
background information could be related in a brief prologue along the lines of what W. E. 
B. Griffin sometimes includes. This would allow me to introduce the OSS to the reader 
straightaway, without having to worry about disrupting the narrative. I could also begin 
the novel without a prologue and have my characters, who are officers in the OSS, set in 
a meeting, reviewing how they have arrived at the point they are at, and where they will 
go from there. 
 Once the background information has been established, the main characters can 
be brought in. They will be based on the two men who served on the Hammer mission. 
Paul Lindner was 33 years old when he was recruited in 1944 for the mission. The 
preliminary report on him, sent to the Bach Unit, described him physically as weighing 
126 pounds, measuring 5 feet 2 inches tall, with a “thin, wiry, tough” build. His face was 
square and small, hair and eyes both brown. His German was tinged with a Berlin accent, 
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he could speak a smattering of Czech, and was also fluent in English. His handler, Joseph 
Gould, noted Lindner could drop his Berlin accent to a degree, but that “certain syllables 
[were] clearly identifiable as Berlinese.” Gould’s report to Bach also describes a scar 
Lindner carried to the right of his nose, a result of an encounter with a group of Nazis 
armed with knuckle rings. He carried other scars from Nazi handling as well, including a 
bayonet scar in his upper-right buttock dating to 1933. He was noted to be a fairly heavy 
smoker but in overall good physical condition. 
 Lindner’s biography is also detailed, discussing his education in Berlin from 1917 
to 1929, where he apprenticed as a machinist, or turner, and studied drafting and 
engineering as well. He lived in Berlin until 1935, when he was forced to flee the Nazis 
to Czechoslovakia. From there he fled to Britain, at which point he was interned as a 
potentially hostile enemy (he was held first in Britain and then sent to Canada to finish 
his internment). Lindner had no military background and no familiarity with German 
military equipment. The Bach report chronicles Lindner’s political activities as well, 
including his illegal work with the Labor League of Youth in Berlin, and contact with the 
Social Democrat party in Czechoslovakia.
158
 
 Lindner’s partner in the Hammer mission was Anton Ruh, age 33. Ruh was bigger 
than Lindner, standing nearly six feet tall, weighing 170 pounds, with a medium build 
and a round face. His hair was recorded as being dark brown but graying, and he had 
gray-blue eyes and a fair complexion. Ruh could speak German without any regional 
dialect as well as with a Berlin accent. His English was quite good, as was his Czech. 
Like Lindner, Ruh’s scars were described: a small scar on his upper lip, resulting from 
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falling on a pointed rock, and some burn marks on his forearms as a result of his work as 
a welder. 
 Also like Lindner, Ruh was an avid smoker yet in “excellent physical condition.” 
He reported occasional headaches “from blow by SA over head with rifle butt,” but 
otherwise his health was good. His biographical sketch reveals study in Berlin from 1918 
until 1930, including time spent as a printing apprentice. After his schooling he was 
employed as a newspaper lithographer. A consistent Nazi enemy, he went into hiding in 
1933 but was arrested later that year and held without trial for seven months. After his 
imprisonment, he established an illegal pamphlet printing shop. When the Nazis 
discovered it, Ruh fled to Czechoslovakia. Ruh remained in Czechoslovakia until the 
Nazis occupied the entire country, at which point he fled to England where he studied 
welding until being interned and deported to Australia in 1940. Ruh was without military 
experience.
159
 
 It is helpful to have these physical and biographical descriptions of Lindner and 
Ruh. From them, the historical novelist can begin to piece together fictional characters 
based on individuals with historical significance.
160
 One begins to gain a sense of the past 
experiences an OSS agent might have had, what sort of education they held, their run-ins 
with the Nazis, and their age and ethnicity. The photographs that are available of Lindner 
and Ruh are likewise of value, for they illustrate the clothing they wore, their hairstyles, 
                                                 
159 Joseph Gould to Bach Unit, Memo, Cover Detail LFB-174 (Anton Ruh), January 23, 1945, 
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160 In some ways, this creating of characters from a conglomeration of real historical figures is 
reminiscent of the methods used by living history museums to create citizens of their created towns and 
farms. This requires thorough research into the societal history, as well as food, clothes, hairstyles, 
technology, and a myriad of other topics if the character is to be historically accurate. For more 
information, see the Midwest Open-Air Museums Magazine and Jay Anderson, ed., A Living History 
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and the look in their eyes.
161
 All of these are important details to have when crafting a 
fictional historical character, for they will bring the character to life in the eyes of the 
readers. This crafting of the characters is a crucial stage in any book. In my novel, the 
characters will be developed and their backgrounds revealed as they progress through the 
various stages of recruitment and training by the OSS. While they will not resemble 
Lindner and Ruh physically, they will be of a similar age and demographic.   
 The biographies also lead the historian to more questions about the two men and 
their experiences that need to be answered if they are to be used as inspiration for a novel. 
One question that Linder and Ruh’s biographies both raise is their connection to 
Czechoslovakia and how and why they learned to speak Czech. Lindner and Ruh both 
fled to Prague in the mid-1930s after encounters with various Nazi police organizations. 
Czechoslovakia was a natural destination for both of them, as it had a number of ethnic 
Germans living there. The two were thus comfortable in Czechoslovakia in terms of 
language and culture. There was also a strong tradition of labor unionism in 
Czechoslovakia, which was allowed there until after the Munich Agreement of 
September 29, 1938. Communism was also allowed until October 20, 1938, giving 
Lindner and Ruh an opportunity to exercise their political beliefs and their resistance 
work without as great a threat of persecution as they faced in Germany.
162
 Lindner 
especially took advantage of his time in Czechoslovakia, moving in January 1937 from 
Prague (where he had arrived in October 1935) to Reichenberg in northern 
Czechoslovakia in order to be closer to the German border so as to intensify his contact 
                                                 
161 See Appendix, Figures 3 and 4. 
162 Trade unions and the German Communist Party were both outlawed in Germany on May 2, 
1933. Theodor Prochazka, “The Second Republic, 1938-1939,” in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 
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with the underground social-democratic groups.
163
 However, the Munich Agreement in 
September 1938 foretold difficult times for men like Lindner and Ruh. The ethnic 
Germans in Czechoslovakia, or Sudeten Germans, began to make moves to favor the 
Nazis, with the major Sudeten party endorsing the Nazis’ attempt to pick apart 
Czechoslovakia.
164
 To Lindner and Ruh this would have meant the acceptance by the 
Sudeten Germans of Nazi institutions like the Gestapo and SA, certainly cause for alarm 
for two men who had been arrested and tortured by such agencies. Indeed, in late 1938 
Ruh was classified as a political fugitive by the Nazis.
165
 Finally, on March 15, 1939, 
when the Nazis began to take over the remainder of Czechoslovakia that they had not 
been granted at Munich, Lindner, Ruh, and thousands of other German national refugees 
in Czechoslovakia realized that, in order to at the least avoid arrest and at the best, 
survive, they would once more have to flee.
166
  
Lindner and Ruh both fled from Czechoslovakia to Britain with the assistance of 
an agency known as the Czech Refugee Trust Fund.
167
 This agency began as the British 
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of the Munich 
Agreement. Its aim was to provide relief and evacuation for refugees, including political 
Sudetenland victims such as Lindner and Ruh. In the end, the Czech Refugee Trust Fund 
aided some eight thousand individuals, including Lindner and Ruh, in escaping 
persecution in Europe.
168
 While the details of Ruh’s escape from Czechoslovakia are 
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unknown, Lindner connected with the Youth Refugee and Relief Council, a section of the 
Czech Refugee Trust Fund. In March 1939, the Council managed to evacuate him to 
Chatham, Kent, where the local branch of the Youth Refugee and Relief Council 
provided him with food and housing.
169
 However, Lindner and Ruh’s journeys did not 
end in Britain; each was deported and briefly interned until the British government 
determined that they, as Germans, did not pose a threat to British security. In any event, 
both men followed similar paths to reach their new lives in London.
170
 No doubt the 
similarities of their experiences must have drawn them even closer together as they 
prepared to penetrate their homeland, now under fascist control.  
This information about the men’s Czech connections, while fascinating, will not 
be a part of my novel. Indeed, it is such an interesting part of Lindner and Ruh’s 
experiences that this part of their stories could be a novel of its own. Thus, here is an 
example of where an author of historical fiction can take some liberties with the plot. 
Every miniscule detail does not have to be uncovered to the reader of a novel. Were I to 
make Lindner and Ruh’s mission into a historical monograph, however, I would certainly 
devote a chapter to their escape from Germany to Czechoslovakia. The idea of doing so 
in my novel, however, threatens to hold back to main part of the story, which is their 
infiltration of Germany. I do not envision my characters spending time in internment 
camps, nor do I wish to explain the complicated nuances of the Czech Refugee Trust 
Fund. Instead, their escape will be simplified and hastened, using other exiles’ stories as 
inspiration. 
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 Lindner and Ruh’s backgrounds also leave the researcher curious about resistance 
movements in Germany before World War II, some of which can be examined by 
looking at the types of resistance these men were involved in. Lindner’s primary focus on 
resistance while still in Germany was with the League of Labor Youth. By 1935, he had 
trained over four hundred German youths, under the guise of hosting a hiking club, in 
matters relating to resistance activities, including distributing pamphlets, painting anti-
Nazi slogans, and evading capture by the Gestapo.
171
 The League of Labor Youths was 
similar to other underground resistance organizations in that members were young, 
willing to take risks, and relatively few in number. The papers available on Ruh do not 
reveal any particular organizational affiliation for his resistance activities, although he 
was involved with Lindner in producing political pamphlets. Ruh also risked his life by 
delivering forged passports to Germany after he had taken refuge in Czechoslovakia. He 
returned to Germany six times on such missions.
172
 Even though one cannot determine 
any official affiliation with a resistance group, Ruh was clearly active in protesting Nazi 
activities and doing what he could to save others from persecution at their hands. This 
again speaks to the nature of resistance movements in Germany in the 1930s. By the time 
Hitler began to dominate every facet of life in the mid-1930s, independent resistance 
movements (those with no ties to the army or other official organizations) had been 
forced to shrink to smaller sizes to avoid detection, to require individuals to take 
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extraordinary risks on their own to execute their work, and to rely on themselves to 
spread their message.
173
 
The biographical backgrounds of these men also allow the historian to analyze 
how the OSS Labor Branch worked practically, for one can evaluate the Hammer mission 
and see how it fit into the greater context of the Labor Branch. The results of these 
evaluations allow the historical novelist to decide whether the Hammer mission is 
representative of Labor Branch work, and, as such, whether elements of the mission 
should be used as inspiration for scenes in the novel. As the reader may recall, the first 
chapter of this work described how the Labor Branch worked with an array of German 
labor groups with differing aims and interests, from socialists to communists and a range 
of ideas in between.
174
 The men of the Hammer mission came from such an organization, 
one known as the Free Germany Committee of Great Britain.  
The aim of the Free Germany Committees, which were off-shoots of the Moscow-
based National Committee for a Free Germany, was to support the war against the Nazis 
by providing information to the Allies about conditions inside Germany, to encourage 
underground resistance groups to rise up and overthrow Hitler, and to convince German 
POWs to rally against the Nazi regime.
175
 The men affiliated with the branch of the Free 
Germany Committee in Britain were Communists. This group was approached by Labor 
Branch officer Joseph Gould in late August 1944, and certain members of the group 
showed an interest in working for OSS. As was typical of the Labor Branch at this time, 
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Gould did not worry about the new recruits’ political persuasion.
176
 However, the fact 
that Lindner and Ruh, as well as the other seven recruits who were plucked from the Free 
German Committee of Great Britain, were Communists initially caused hesitation among 
upper- level OSS staff. In late 1944 and early 1945, Free Germany Committees were 
springing up in nations across western Europe. The top staff in the OSS and  
U. S. government was concerned that an “international Moscow line,” or plan overseen 
by Moscow to Bolshevize Germany after the war, was forming, and feared that using 
OSS agents with connections to the Free Germany Committee would only weaken the 
United States’ postwar position in Germany.
177
 Even William Casey, who had so strongly 
supported the Labor Branch and its plans for infiltration, had reservations, fearing that 
working too closely with the Communists would distance the OSS from its relationship 
with British intelligence.
178
    
Eventually, the fear of using Communists to execute missions for the OSS was 
trumped by the assurance that they were willing to penetrate their Nazi homeland on 
behalf of the United States in order to provide valuable intelligence to assist the Allied 
war effort. Arthur Goldberg, head of the Labor Division, took the matter to Bill Donovan, 
director of the OSS. Goldberg argued straight from the directive that had created the 
OSS, claiming that “the letter and spirit” of that directive had “expressly referenced the 
potential enlistment of irregular forces in fighting the war.”
179
 Donovan approved, and on 
February 22, 1945, the Hammer mission received the final approval. This argument 
within the OSS represents the Labor Branch’s continuing insistence that the sheer need to 
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defeat the Nazis outweighed political ideology in the struggle to infiltrate Germany. The 
approval of Lindner and Ruh’s mission in late 1944 also demonstrates the change in the 
OSS leadership opinion about penetrating Germany, for they finally were willing to allow 
the Labor Branch to use Communists as part of the Allied war effort.
180
  
Knowing Lindner and Ruh’s backgrounds in resistance movements is important 
for a few reasons. First, awareness of their participation in the resistance enables me to 
choose what my characters’ backgrounds should be. Were they involved in printing anti-
Nazi propaganda, like Lindner and Ruh, or do I want to reach elsewhere for inspiration 
and have them participate in underground subversive activities, like tampering with 
machines? I actually will use a combination of these and have one of my characters be 
more of the intellectual frame of mind, and the other more physical. Having a character 
of each trait will arrange for tensions between the two men as they work their mission 
together. It will also enable me to inform readers about the various types of resistance 
that occurred early on in the Nazi regime. 
Lindner and Ruh’s resistance work is an example of how the Hammer mission 
reflects two facets of OSS and Labor Branch history. First, the Labor Branch recruited 
Communists, and second, the OSS leadership did use Communists to infiltrate Germany. 
This confirmation gives me free reign to include a plot line like this in the novel. 
However, it also presents a potential challenge: will readers be able to relate to 
Communist agents? Should I depict the characters based on Lindner and Ruh as 
Communists? In my estimation, it is necessary for my two characters to be Communists. 
It sets up a dramatic conflict between the agents and their handlers, and also sets the stage 
                                                 
180 See p. 13 of chapter one, which discusses the reasons behind the OSS leaderships’ reluctance to 
use Communists, Socialists, and others they considered to be unreliable.  
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for post-war political problems. Furthermore, their being Communist will provide a 
motive for them wanting to infiltrate Germany and bring down the Nazi regime, a critical 
part of this novel. The characters need a convincing reason to turn traitor against their 
homeland, and the fact that they and their friends would have been persecuted from the 
earliest days of the Hitler government is such a reason. 
Lindner and Ruh’s connections to the Free Germany Committee also raise 
questions about how I will have the OSS recruit my two characters. I would feel most 
comfortable following a storyline that is close to Lindner and Ruh’s experiences, because 
the way they were recruited is among the most common of methods used by the OSS. 
Also, having the characters as members of an exile group will open a door to a world of 
individuals chased out of their homeland, mistrusted by the English population, 
struggling to make ends meet in a foreign land. The opportunities to discuss the 
emotional turmoil plaguing my characters would be many in this situation. It will also be 
easier for me to discuss a recruitment method with which I am familiar from the OSS 
perspective as well. There are many documents and reports that I will be able to access to 
best understand and describe how OSS officers were able to persuade men like Lindner 
and Ruh to join them. 
Perusing the training and mission files of the men is similarly helpful to an 
aspiring novelist and historian. One can compare and contrast the actual experiences of 
the agents with the way training was supposed to proceed according to Bach standards, 
such as the type of covers created, the use of the agents’ own ideas in creating their 
covers, and the types of documents they were issued to complete their mission. This 
exercise again allows the researcher to discover where the mission fits in the larger 
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spectrum of OSS history, and reveals the extent to which the mission can be used by a 
historical novelist as a reliable model for events in a novel. 
As mentioned in chapter two, one of Bach’s first steps in creating a cover story 
was gathering a biographical sketch on the agent. The biographies for Lindner and Ruh, 
documented earlier in this chapter, were standard in terms of the biographical information 
they included. One knows from their sketches, for example, what their smoking habits 
were, their school histories, where they had worked and what they had done in each job, 
and the types of individuals and groups that each man was most comfortable associating 
with. All of this information was essential to Bach staffers and commonly requested by 
them.
181
 In the instance of Hammer, Bach knew everything necessary to create strong 
cover stories. 
Remember that Bach also paid close attention to an agent’s family history when 
creating cover stories. Generally speaking, Bach ensured that in a cover story the agent’s 
hometown was some distance away from the area of operation so as to reduce the number 
of checks that might be done into his background while on his mission.
182
 In Hammer’s 
case, both men were cast as refugees, Lindner from Koenigsberg, Germany and Ruh from 
Breslau, Czechoslovakia. Both of their stories had them fleeing to Berlin to find work and 
avoid the approaching Russians.
183
 The fact that both were refugees from cities east of 
Berlin and along the Russian lines made their covers difficult for any German officials to 
verify, and therefore safer for Lindner and Ruh to use. After all, by March 1945 it would 
have be extremely difficult for a Nazi officer to call and investigate whether their papers 
                                                 
181 See chapter two, 13-14. 
182 See chapter two, 18. 
183 OSS/London War Diary, reel 7, vol. 6, p. 434; also Report,  Lt. H.C. Sutton, “Hammer team, 
Interrogation on Operational Experience,” June 27, 1945, RG 226, Hammer files. 
  
 
103 
were valid, considering Lindner and Ruh’s “home towns” were on the verge of being 
overrun or already captured by Allied forces. The covers that Bach crafted for the 
Hammer mission thus followed their usual pattern and once more proved impregnable. 
Ruh’s cover as a Czech refugee came in especially handy at one very tense 
moment in the mission. While returning to Berlin from a trip to pick up materials and 
supplies, the two men were stopped by an SS officer who demanded to see their papers 
and also the contents of their bag. Ruh, who was carrying the bag, pretended to have very 
limited understanding of German (he was, after all, using the cover of a Czech refugee). 
Lindner, meanwhile, attempted to explain to the SS officer that his friend could not 
understand what he was being asked. This little skit went on to include Ruh pulling dirty 
laundry out of the bag, the SS officer getting frustrated with the “inferior” Czech 
imbecile before him, and ended when the officer simply concluded that there was only 
laundry in the bag.
184
 After the mission, Ruh commented that if the officer had persisted 
in asking questions or attempted to search the bag himself, he and Lindner would not 
have hesitated to “blow out his guts” with the pistols they carried at all times.
185
 In 
actuality, neither man on the Hammer mission drew their pistols while executing their 
mission. Indeed, the only time that they used their weapons was during the fall of Berlin, 
when they attempted to prevent a bridge into the city from being blown up by 
Germans.
186
 
This is a classic story of OSS agent close calls in Germany. Both primary and 
secondary sources detail story after story like this, and there will certainly be room for 
inclusion of a few in my novel. Such moments allow for heart-stopping suspense and 
                                                 
184 OSS/London War Diary, vol. 6, reel 7, p. 442. 
185 OSS Report, “Interrogation-Hammer Team,” June 27, 1945, p. 5, Hammer files, RG 226, NA.  
186 Jonathan Gould, “Strange Bedfellows,” 13. 
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drama. The occasional search by a Gestapo officer also reminds the reader of the constant 
peril facing the characters. Such scenes like these can be played out on a street corner, on 
a train, or near a store. Wherever it does happen, it is sure to be a tense moment and one 
which keeps the reader firmly grounded in the terror of the German state.  
Lindner and Ruh obviously had to make use of the covers that had been provided 
to them by Bach; Ruh used his Czech cover (aptly suited to him after his years of exile in 
Czechoslovakia) to his advantage when confronted by the SS officer, and Lindner had no 
trouble pulling off his story either. One of the reasons their stories worked so well was 
due to the documents they received from Bach that supported their stories.
187
 Lindner, to 
complete his cover as a German national, carried a Kennkarte (identification card), 
Wehrpass and Wehrpassnotiz (military documents), a Mitgliedskarte NSDAP (showing 
him to be a member of the Nazi party), and an Arbeitsbuch (containing his work orders). 
Ruh, as a Czech refugee, carried only the Kennkarte and Arbeitsbuch. Both also carried 
ration cards.
188
 Their cover names appear on their papers as well; Lindner was Ewald 
Engelke, and Ruh was Antonin Vesily. These documents and false names stood up to 
three detailed inspections by German officials and never once raised suspicions. In fact, 
after the mission Lindner commented that his Nazi party membership card was the most 
useful piece of fake identification, for it put him on an even footing with those who 
inspected his papers, and made those inspectors feel more trustful of him.
189
  
 The Hammer agents’ covers clearly were strong and well-thought out. The 
thoroughness that was applied to Hammer’s covers was indicative of Bach’s consistent 
effort to make OSS agents as safe as possible while deployed. Hammer’s work with Bach 
                                                 
187 For more on Bach’s handling of documents, see chapter two, 4. 
188 See Appendix.  
189 OSS Interrogation, Hammer Team, June 27, 1945, Hammer files, RG 226, NA. 
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was also closely reflective of many of the policies the Bach employed, from the 
information about the agents’ backgrounds to the issuance of documents. Hence, 
Hammer once again shows itself as a good representative mission of the OSS penetration 
of Germany.  
The creation of my characters’ cover stories may be one of the more challenging 
aspects of the novel. In a way, it will be like creating a third and fourth main character 
and adding them to the plot. In order for their mission to succeed, their covers will need 
to be as good as those that Bach created for Lindner and Ruh. Fortunately, my extensive 
research on the Bach Section will enable me to embark on this process more comfortably. 
Much of the process of creating the cover stories will be based on Bach’s own 
procedures: since I will already have my main characters created and developed, I should 
have an excellent understanding of what cover would work best for each of them, the 
documents that they would require, and so on. This portion of the novel will directly 
follow my characters’ recruitment and lead into the training portion of the novel.  
The Hammer team’s training and preparation for deployment was also standard 
within the Labor Branch. Lindner and Ruh’s mission training files and processing forms 
show that each passed their medical exams, completed parachute training, obtained a 
security clearance, completed general agent training, and finished all communications, 
cover, equipment, financial, and briefing exercises. These checklists were standard to all 
missions sent from London and thus provide good insight for the historical novelist about 
what the training and preparation procedures were, as well as what point in the training 
process each area might be addressed.
190
 Similarly, Lindner and Ruh’s “Course Control 
                                                 
190 OSS Report, Phil Land and Toni Reuss (aliases), Processing Form #3, personnel folders, 
Hammer files, RG 226, NA. 
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Sheets” identify exactly which training courses the men underwent, from “Alibi (and 
Problem)” to “Meet your Enemy Exercise” to “German Road Signs.” Again, a perusal of 
the checklists allows the historical novelist to glean how well the mission fit within the 
larger practices of the OSS; in this case, the Hammer mission was once more quite 
standard.
191
 
Comparing the Hammer mission to Labor Branch and Bach procedures is 
necessary in order to establish a solid idea of what an OSS mission into Germany was 
like and how it fit into the framework of the OSS organization. Failing to do so would 
jeopardize any legitimacy a historical novelist would like to maintain. However, there are 
unique moments in the Hammer mission, as in others, that on their own are fascinating 
and excellent inspiration for events to include in a historical novel about the infiltration of 
Germany. One of the most interesting nuances of the Hammer mission occurred during 
Lindner’s training. His handler and members of the Bach Section were constantly trying 
to improve their agents’ chances for survival. To do so, someone had the idea of 
infiltrating agents-in-training into German prisoner of war camps to practice a cover story 
for a week. In this setting, agents might learn to improvise when asked questions, gather 
intelligence about the situation in Germany and the soldiers’ morale, and glean 
information that would help them blend in better when they entered Germany on their 
missions. Most of all, it would get them comfortable with lying about who they were and 
where they had come from.  
Lindner was among the few agents who underwent this unusual aspect of training. 
Before entering a German POW camp in early 1945, he first spent two weeks 
                                                 
191 OSS Report, Phil Land and Toni Reuss (aliases), Course Control Sheet, personnel folders, 
Hammer files, RG 226, NA. 
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interviewing cooperative POWs and began to craft a cover out of what they told him. One 
of his interviewees was a 19-year-old parachutist who described at length his training, 
experiences at the front, and capture. Another prisoner told Lindner about conditions in 
the town he was supposed to be from, and a third filled him in on the state of 
manufacturing in Germany and the operation of factories. From this, Lindner cobbled his 
own story (different from the one he employed when he infiltrated Germany) to get him 
through life in the camp. No one from OSS assisted him in creating this cover, other than 
giving him a name, hometown, and military unit; they wanted him to think for himself 
and come up with ideas based on his personal experiences, the people he met, and what 
they told him. According to Lindner’s report after he left the POW camp, he believed that 
receiving no advice from OSS on his cover was “good for our training; we were forced to 
develop our own ideas and to take the risk of our own mistakes. Inventing the story, 
living up to it, and controlling it in all details, was the main result of this.” The ultimate 
aim, of course, was to develop in the agents the ability to adapt their Bach-created covers 
to life as they found it when they entered Germany on their missions.
192
 
The idea of training an agent within the confines of a prisoner of war camp is 
exciting because it provides an opportunity to include a small but very interesting factual 
part of history. Even though it was an uncommon method of training, I would feel 
comfortable using such an idea in a work of fiction based on fact. It presents me with all 
sorts of possibilities for my characters, one of whom will train in such a camp. Lindner’s 
                                                 
192 Paul Lindner, “Report about one week’s life and experience in a P.W. camp,” late January, 
1945, Hammer files, RG 226, NA. What also strikes this historical novelist as interesting is Lindner’s 
reference to “inventing” his own cover story. In a way, the historical novelist is also engaged in the 
business of invention. She uses her knowledge about the past to create her characters and their cover 
stories, just as Lindner used his knowledge from German POWs and others to create a character of his own. 
This similarity gives the historical novelist both encouragement about fictionalizing the past and inspiration 
for how to do it.   
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report after he left the camp also included a list of slang that German soldiers were 
commonly using, which is a vital source for me, as I will be constantly attempting to get 
nuances of day-to-day life correct. Simply put, studying the unusual events that occurred 
within missions allows the historical novelist to supplement the common elements of 
OSS work with real events that add color and vibrancy to the past. Since the events 
actually happened, they have a place within the historian’s attempt at a novel. In this 
instance, it is such a rich opportunity for having one of my characters practice his cover 
and learning what he can expect to encounter inside Germany that it would be foolish to 
leave it out. 
The fact that Lindner and Ruh entered Berlin was also unusual. They were the 
first team from London to enter the capital, and did so after parachuting from an A-26 
airplane, another OSS first. Details like these, specific to each mission, confront the 
novelist with the issue of choosing which real events to use. Should I set my story in 
Berlin or elsewhere? Of course, the other missions that went into Germany were scattered 
in different cities and regions, so I do not feel beholden to choosing the area most often 
infiltrated. Because there is no “representative” or typical area that OSS agents 
penetrated, I have the liberty to pick the place about which I feel most comfortable 
writing. In this case, I will stick with Berlin. It is the area that I have the most familiarity 
with, especially in spring of 1945, and thus it will be easier for me to impress upon the 
reader the sights, smells, and sounds of Berlin at that time. There is no need for me to 
invent what I already know to be true, thus the Nazi capital is where my characters will 
land. 
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Similarly, every team’s entry into Germany was different; no two parachute 
landings were the same, and some agents were infiltrated on foot or bicycle. In my novel, 
though, elements from a few different missions will be combined to give a reader a sense 
of what a parachute landing was like. I can glean from mission reports what the mood 
was on the planes that carried the agents, and also what happened once agents left the 
plane, then use this information to create a fictional landing based on actual missions.  
When Lindner and Ruh parachuted into the outskirts of Berlin after midnight on 
March 2, 1945, they buried their parachutes and communications equipment and took a 
train to downtown Berlin. They were supposed to meet a member of the underground 
resistance, but the darkness caused by the blackout and late hour made it too risky to 
confirm the address. Fortunately, they had a backup plan and went to Lindner’s parents’ 
home. He had not seen his family since 1935 and their reunion was joyous. Lindner and 
Ruh spent the next few days acclimatizing themselves to war torn Berlin, its controls, and 
how they would get around the city. 
Their primary mission in Berlin was to gather intelligence of the type relayed in 
the transcribed message that appears earlier in this chapter. Troop and train locations, the 
status of any resistance activities, information about home front morale: all of these 
topics were things that Lindner and Ruh paid close attention to and reported on during 
their two successful contacts with OSS planes. They also made contact with resistance 
groups whose contact information had been provided by the Free Germany Committee in 
France. Lindner’s brother-in-law, whom he had never met before, also joined them in 
their intelligence-gathering pursuits. These groups and individuals all provided Lindner 
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and Ruh with intelligence on Berlin’s defenses, which was then passed on to the OSS in 
their transmission on April 8, 1945. 
However, the Soviets reached Berlin first and encircled the city. On April 24, 
after helping the Soviet Army prevent a group of Germans from blowing up a bridge into 
the city, they turned themselves over to a Russian captain, identifying themselves as OSS 
agents. Unfortunately for Lindner and Ruh, the officer did not believe them and had them 
arrested. They were subjected to harsh interrogations, held for nearly two months, and 
finally released to the U. S. Army near Leipzig on June 16, 1945. From there they were 
flown to Paris, and finally back to their families in London.
193
  
Lindner and Ruh’s actual accomplishments inside the Reich varied little from 
other missions. They gathered intelligence, made some limited contacts with resistance 
groups, passed the information they had on to the OSS on two occasions, and then were 
overrun. While they had a few unusual moments in Berlin, including bartering cigarettes 
and coffee for a sheep that they butchered and had for dinner, the Hammer mission was 
straightforward.
194
 In my mind, however, what they did once they were in Berlin is less 
significant than the fact that they volunteered for the mission, made it to Berlin, and 
survived. That is my reason for researching their story and for using it as a basis for my 
novel. The bravery inherent in turning traitor against their home country, leaving their 
families (they were both married and each had young children), embarking on a perilous 
journey just to parachute into Berlin, and adjusting to living in a city on the brink of total 
devastation is the best part of their story. Their journey through the OSS, and the Labor 
                                                 
193 Details of the events in these paragraphs can be found in the following: Lt. 
Joseph Gould, Memorandum, “Hammer Mission,” March 12, 1945. Lt. H.C. Sutton, 
Memorandum, “Hammer Team: Interrogation on Operational Experiences,” June 27, 
1945, OSS/London War Diary, 436-456.  
194 Jonathan Gould, “Strange Bedfellows,” 22.  
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Branch’s unyielding insistence that they could do what everyone else thought was 
impossible, is the story I will use as inspiration for my novel. While a major portion of 
the book will be set in Berlin, and while my characters will make discoveries about the 
infrastructure of the city and report on them using the proper communication equipment, 
I feel that creating characters who think, feel, and describe what they are going through 
before they get to Berlin will be more effective than detailing their day-to-day existence 
while on their mission. Sometimes, the journey is more important than the destination. 
Clearly, a significant portion of my novel will be based on the events of the 
Hammer mission. However, the historical novelist should not forget to peruse multiple 
missions into Germany for other inspirational events. In the Martini mission, one of the 
agents’ Bach-provided papers betrayed him; he was caught and nearly executed.
195
 While 
this was an anomalous occurrence in that less than 5 percent of OSS operatives in 
Germany were captured or killed, the events surrounding the agent’s capture might be 
used to gather details on how the Gestapo checked papers, conducted interrogation, and 
treated prisoners. On the opposite end of the spectrum regarding the Gestapo, the Painter 
mission managed to infiltrate and begin working at a Gestapo garage. Through a deal 
with a pair of Nazis who had been tracking them since their landing, the agents obtained 
the payroll of the entire Gestapo organization in and around Munich. The list provided 
the real and cover names for all officers, undercover agents, and informants, as well as 
their addresses. In return, the Painter agents “promised” that when the Americans arrived, 
they would arrange for the informants to be shipped to South America and provided with 
money to live comfortably. Not surprisingly, the OSS agents did not hold up their end of 
                                                 
195 See chapter two, 25. 
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the bargain; instead they turned in the two Gestapo agents as war criminals.
196
 This 
mission might be used as the basis for placing one of my OSS characters, though not 
necessarily a main character, within a Nazi organization, without completely inventing 
how it was done. 
While the two missions mentioned briefly above have not been discussed as 
closely as the Hammer mission, they and others still retain value to the historical novelist 
looking to use a range of OSS missions as a basis for her work. When a case study like 
the one provided for the Hammer mission is done in conjunction with careful research on 
the OSS, the Labor Branch, the Bach Section, a historian can make judgments about 
other missions and how they can be utilized in a work of historical fiction. The historical 
novelist who takes the time to get to know the context of the topic can more quickly and 
accurately look at other mission files and understand what was typical, what was unusual, 
what aspects can be used in laying the foundation for the novel, and what needs to be 
handled cautiously to avoid giving the impression that an anomalous aspect of a mission 
was normal. For example, nearly any OSS mission to Germany could be used as the basis 
for the types of cover stories the agents went in with. While each story had a bit of a twist 
to it, careful research in chapter two demonstrates that most were reliably similar. On the 
other hand, the novelist could not place her character within a Gestapo garage without 
making note that this was unusual or an intelligence coup. 
It is the historical novelist’s responsibility not to mislead her readers about what 
in the book is based on fact and what is fiction, what was usual and what was not. In my 
novel I will inform readers, via unobtrusive endnotes, when I have described an event as 
it happened or as it is told in the historical record, when I have combined elements from a 
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number of missions, and when I have taken liberties with past events. There may also be 
times where I invent portions of a story to fill in gaps, or to keep the reader’s interest. 
Regardless of the situation, a responsible author will make note of what she is doing. The 
inclusion of endnotes, listed chronologically by chapter using the beginning of a 
sentence, makes it more likely that the reader will actually be educated by a work of 
historical fiction. Such notes help ensure that readers cannot take scenes from the book 
for granted. Instead, a reader can turn to the notes and read about where the author got the 
information being described and its significance within OSS history. Thus, both the 
author and reader have a responsibility in historical fiction: the author to present 
historical material that is based on quality research, and the reader to take the initiative to 
consult the author’s notes and analyze and understand the historical content that is being 
presented. 
Every mission that the OSS launched into Germany had quirks that made it 
unusual or anomalous. Such is the nature of secret intelligence. Despite peculiarities 
individual to each mission, all of the infiltration missions into Germany contain 
something of use to the historical novelist. Whether that inspiration is simply the form of 
a character, an example of false identity papers, the agent’s experience parachuting into 
Germany, or a team’s narrow brush with the Gestapo, all are relevant because they 
actually happened. The use of the Hammer mission as a case study, then, is primarily 
intended to prevent the novelist from randomly picking and choosing “juicy” details from 
a variety of missions and placing them haphazardly out of context. Every mission both 
fits and conflicts somewhere within the framework established by the hierarchy of the 
OSS, from the Bach Section, to the Labor Branch, to Secret Intelligence, to the top of 
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OSS itself. As a result, the historian and historical novelist in particular needs to take the 
individual missions for what they were: specific exercises in a larger-scale plan and 
within a conflicted organization. Hammer, for example, did not exist in a vacuum. It was 
part of the Faust plan, which was an operation particular to London’s SI branch, which 
again was subordinate to OSS Washington. By analyzing a specific mission within the 
greater OSS history, the novelist learns to keep all other missions in context, and also is 
forced to examine in more detail the history of the OSS. In doing so, the novelist 
becomes more familiar with the history of the OSS, and thereby better prepared to write a 
respectable historical fiction about it.  
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Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this thesis has been two-fold: to underscore the necessity of 
historical fiction to incorporate scholarly research, and to contribute to the historiography 
of the OSS by closely studying the contributions and the impact of its Labor Branch. 
Bringing these two elements together has proven challenging and rewarding. While I 
have not yet completed a first draft of my novel about the OSS using the practices that I 
suggest in this work, I do have full confidence that I can incorporate what I have 
uncovered about the Labor Branch and its Hammer mission into a novel.  
 It is unfortunate that history and fiction have so much in common and yet remain 
in the minds of many people far apart in purpose, style, and methods. There will never be 
consensus on how much of history is really fiction, and how much readers of historical 
fiction can truly learn about the past. However, taking the time and effort to bring 
academic-quality history into the more public sphere of fiction can only improve both. 
Doing so will encourage historians to think of a wider audience and to share their wealth 
of knowledge, and their talents, with people other than their highly specialized 
colleagues. A reader of good historical fiction will be eager to learn more about the 
history of a topic, and perhaps pick up a historical monograph to learn more details and to 
discover for himself where history and fiction meet.  
 The responsibility for all of this falls on the author of historical fiction. It is a 
tedious task, and a time-consuming one, to thoroughly research a historical topic. But in 
doing so, an author will be armed with a wealth of ideas, with a means of organizing a 
plot and creating characters, and with the confidence that comes with knowledge. She 
will have the ability to choose what to include, and to be so familiar with the details as to 
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weave them into the narrative seamlessly, without hitting the reader over the head with 
historical facts and jargon. Indeed, there are few better prepared to write historical fiction 
than the historian herself. 
 As regards the OSS Labor Branch, the research I have conducted in the creation 
of this thesis has built upon the historiography that is traced in the introduction. As those 
who have come before me have leaned upon OSS documents, reports, and memos, I have 
also found these sources by far to be the most insightful and provocative. To read 
correspondence detailing missions that went terribly wrong to a report from an officer 
written just hours after sending two of his agents into Berlin, the thousands of pages of 
text available at the National Archives hold the captivating truth about America’s first 
central intelligence agency. 
 The Labor Branch documents in particular grabbed my attention. While previous 
monographs certainly mentioned the Labor Branch, no one had yet investigated the 
extent of the Branch’s contribution to the overall success of the German infiltration. My 
analysis of the Labor Branch in London, how it fit within Secret Intelligence, and its 
persistence in the belief that the penetration of Germany was possible revealed that the 
way the Branch organized itself ensured success. The staff of the Labor Branch worked 
as a team and did not seem to experience the amount of in-fighting that plagued other 
branches of the OSS. The leadership of the Branch coordinated with the lower-ranking 
men and women to ensure that each person worked where they were most capable, 
whether in translation of documents, creation of cover stories, or research. The Labor 
Branch had such success in this regard that the OSS reorganized a major section of itself 
on the Labor Branch model.  
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 I also took a close look at the Labor Branch’s Bach Section, and discovered that 
without it, no infiltration of Germany would have been possible. I synthesized and 
evaluated a wealth of primary materials on Bach and as a result created a comprehensive 
analysis of how Bach functioned, why it was so successful, and how crucial it became to 
the rest of the OSS in Europe. This material, contained in chapter two, will supplement 
the primary sources available and allow for other scholars and those simply interested in 
the OSS to understand the background behind the infiltration of Germany. 
 The Hammer mission is also comprehensively detailed. While I avoided giving a 
blow-by-blow account of the entire mission, I aimed more to analyze it in the context of 
the Labor Branch and the greater OSS. I explored how the mission both met and failed to 
meet a “typical” Labor Branch standard, if there is such a thing. I also attempted to get to 
know the two men of the Hammer mission, Paul Lindner and Anton Ruh, in hopes of 
using their experiences as inspiration for characters in my novel. Many details of their 
mission were utilized in the same way, giving historians a new perspective on how to 
approach research on the OSS and indeed on any historical topic. In its own way, this is 
an addition to the historiography, for I have used a different methodology to examine a 
well-known mission, and drawn some new information from it. 
 The Office of Strategic Services was an organization full of characters, mystery, 
and intrigue. For these reasons, it is ideally suited to be a topic of historical fiction. The 
historical research I have completed on the OSS positions me well to write such a work. I 
certainly have the historical tools as my disposal; the challenge now is to combine them 
with the skills required of the novelist. I certainly will try. 
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Appendices 
 
Figure 1 
 
OSS Organization Chart 
 
An example of an OSS Hierarchy/Organizational Chart. In this case the Labor Branch 
would have been located along the left-hand side of the chart, beneath the main S.I. box. 
This particular chart dates to October 17, 1942 
 
From The War Report of the OSS, p. 12.
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Figure 2 
 
Map of Infiltration Sites in Germany 
 
This map shows both drop and general operation locations of the Secret Intelligence 
Teams directed from London that infiltrated Germany and Austria. Note Downend’s 
location just west of Dortmund. Also notice the naming of some missions after alcoholic 
beverages. This was not designed to correspond with OSS’s reputation of being, “Oh, so 
social!” but referred instead to any mission whose primary goal was to gather military 
intelligence (see Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler, 181). 
 
Map taken from The Overseas Target, p. 316. 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Photographs of Paul Lindner
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
Photographs of Anton Ruh  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photographs of Lindner and Ruh courtesy of Jonathan Gould 
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Note on Sources 
 
 Some of the primary source materials used in this thesis were obtained with the 
help and generosity of Dr. Christof Mauch, director of the German Historical Institute in 
Washington, D.C. Through a connection at Kalamazoo College, Dr. Mauch opened his 
personal collection of OSS documents to me, saving me much time and energy in 
gathering documents from the National Archives and other repositories. His kindness is 
much appreciated. Jonathan Gould, son of a Labor Branch recruitment officer, also 
provided valuable sources, his father’s unpublished biography, and insight into the life 
and personality of one OSS officer. I thank him for his generosity. 
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